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1 
“Surplus Humanity” and the Margins of 
Legality:  Slums, Slumdogs, and 
Accumulation by Dispossession 
Tayyab Mahmud* 
Marooned on the outskirts of the law, more than one billion 
people worldwide live in urban slums and squatter settlements, 
mostly in the global South.  Law, extra-legality, and illegality 
commingle in urban slums to produce spaces and subjects at the 
margins of legal orders and formal economies.  Three enduring 
and inter-related features of capitalism—accumulation by 
dispossession, a reserve army of labor, and an informal sector of 
the economy—produce and sustain urban slums.  The genesis and 
persistence of slums and slum-dwellers testify to the iron fist of 
the state working in concert with the hidden hand of the market 
in the service of accumulation of capital.  Over the last thirty 
years, neoliberal restructuring of economies and reordering of the 
responsibilities of states have accentuated this process.  As a 
result, slums in the global South have grown exponentially.  An 
examination of public policy and pronouncements of the judiciary 
in India, as they related to slums and slum-dwellers, calls into 
question traditional understandings of the law, citizenship, and 
responsibilities of the state.  Mainstream remedial prescriptions 
for housing for the urban poor increasingly rely on market forces, 
falling woefully short of their goal, and often accentuating the 
problem.  The incipient right to the city provides a productive 
framework to re-imagine the concept of citizenship, and to guide 
public policy and popular action to ensure adequate housing with 
dignity for the urban poor and marginalized. 
 
 
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Global Justice, Seattle University 
School of Law.  I want to thank Jaswinder Brara, Richard Delgado, Carmen Gonzalez, 
Hamid Khan, Victoria Kill, Henry McGee, Audrey McFarlane, Bob Menanteaux, Charles 
Pouncy, and Meenakshi Rishi for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts.  Research 
librarians at Seattle University School of Law provided invaluable assistance with this 
project. 
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One’s ideological perspective is likely to be shaped by one’s housing 
status.1 
       —Peter Ward 
[T]here is a politics of space because space is political.2 
       —Henri Lefebvre 
INTRODUCTION 
From Cabrini-Green in Chicago to the Mau Forest in Kenya, 
the housing of the poor is threatened by predatory forces 
unleashed by global capitalism in its neoliberal incarnation.3  
Formal housing markets in the global South4 rarely supply more 
than twenty percent of new housing needs, turning people to self-
built shanties, informal rentals, pirate subdivisions, or the 
streets.5  The population of slums and shantytowns on the urban 
peripheries often outnumbers that of the city, leading some to 
suggest that “[t]hese compounds are called ‘peri-urban’ but in 
reality, it is the city proper that is peripheral.”6  Planning experts 
warn that if this trend continues, “we will have only slums and 
no cities.”7  Urban slums are seen as warehouses of “surplus 
humanity,”8 and slum-dwellers as a “surplus population.”9  A 
 
 1 PETER M. WARD, MEXICO CITY: THE PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION OF AN 
URBAN ENVIRONMENT 193 (Richard Peet ed., 1990). 
 2 Henri Lefebvre, Reflections on the Politics of Space, in RADICAL GEOGRAPHY: 
ALTERNATIVE VIEWPOINTS ON CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL ISSUES 339, 345 (1978). 
 3 See generally Megan Cottrell, At the End of her Rope: Cabrini-Green Resident 
Faces Eviction Tomorrow, TRUE/SLANT (Nov. 16, 2009, 10:00 AM), http://trueslant.com/ 
megancottrell/2009/11/16/at-the-end-of-her-rope-cabrini-green-resident-faces-eviction-
tomorrow/; Jeffrey Gettleman, Forest People May Lose Home in Kenyan Plan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 15, 2009, at A6. 
 4 The terms “global South” and “global North” are used here not necessarily to 
describe distinct geographical regions, but to indicate what have been termed the “two-
third” and “one-third” populations of the world that occupy broadly different 
positionalities within the global economy. See Eric Sheppard & Richa Nagar, From East–
West to North–South, 36 ANTIPODE 557, 557–58 (2004). 
 5 A. S. OBERAI, POPULATION GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY IN THIRD-WORLD 
MEGA-CITIES: ANALYTICAL AND POLICY ISSUES 13 (1993).  See also ROBERT NEUWIRTH, 
SHADOW CITIES: A BILLION SQUATTERS, A NEW URBAN WORLD 7–9 (2005); MARK KRAMER, 
DISPOSSESSED: LIFE IN OUR WORLD’S URBAN SLUMS 3–4 (2006).  Accurate statistics are 
difficult to come by because poverty estimates are often obfuscated and slum populations 
are under-counted. See, e.g., JONATHAN RIGG, SOUTHEAST ASIA: A REGION IN TRANSITION 
119, 143–46 (1991). 
 6 K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, Urban Governance: Changing Realities, in PREPARING 
FOR THE URBAN FUTURE: GLOBAL PRESSURES AND LOCAL FORCES 225, 229 (Michael A. 
Cohen et al. eds., 1996). 
 7 Gautam Chatterjee, Consensus versus Confrontation, 8 HABITAT DEBATE 11, 11 
(2002). 
 8 Mike Davis, Planet of Slums: Urban Involution and the Informal Proletariat, 26 
NEW LEFT REV. 5, 23 (2004). 
 9 Henry Veltmeyer, Surplus Labor and Class Formation on the Latin American 
Periphery, in THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT: MODES OF PRODUCTION OR DEPENDENCY? 212 
(Ronald H. Chilcote & Dale L. Johnson eds., 1983). 
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global study finds that “[t]he primary direction of both national 
and international interventions during the last twenty years has 
actually increased urban poverty and slums.”10  In a world where 
“2.7 billion struggle to survive on less than two dollars per day,”11 
urban poverty may well be the “most significant, and politically 
explosive, problem of the . . . century.”12 
The ongoing global recession and the popularity of the 
Academy Award winning film Slumdog Millionaire13 furnish a 
unique opportunity to reexamine the question of slums.  The 
2007–2009 deep recession and the global financial crisis are 
lifting the fog of neoliberal market ideologies that have 
dominated global and national public policies for over a 
generation.14  This has opened up the possibilities for clear-eyed 
analyses of how market forces and the law come together to 
produce questionable distributions of gain and pain.  Slums and 
urban poverty are ripe for such an analysis. 
Set in Dharavi, the infamous slum of Mumbai, Slumdog 
Millionaire is an acerbic snapshot of law and illegality tangled in 
a brutal drama of power and resistance in the life of slum-
dwellers.  We see an urban space that radically departs from the 
original meaning of “city,”—which is derived from civ’tade, 
civitat-em, and civitas, and “its primary sense was therefore 
‘citizenship’; thence concretely ‘the body of citizens, the 
community.’”15  Neither does the modern “public sphere,” 
 
 10 UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS: GLOBAL REPORT ON HUMAN 
SETTLEMENTS 2003, at 6 (2003) [hereinafter UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS]. 
 11 Fast Facts: The Faces of Poverty, UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT, 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/resources/fastfacts_e.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 
2010). 
 12 Anqing Shi, How Access to Urban Potable Water and Sewerage Connections Affects 
Child Mortality 14 (World Bank Dev. Res. Group. Finance, Working Paper No. 2274, 
2000). 
 13 Slumdog Millionaire—Official Site, FOX SEARCHLIGHT, 
http://www.foxsearchlight.com/slumdogmillionaire/.  The term “slumdog,” borrowed from 
this film, can be seen as an offensive characterization of those who live in slums.  I use it, 
as I believe the film does, by combining the words “slum” and “underdog” to signal the 
subordinated and marginalized state of those constrained to make slums their abode.  The 
meaning of a slum has evolved over time, substantiating that “(spatiolegal) 
representations are imbricated with elements of the (spatiolegal) material world.” David 
Delaney, Tracing Displacements: Or Evictions in the Nomosphere, 22 ENV’T & PLAN. D: 
SOC’Y & SPACE 847, 851 (2004).  For a critique of the deployment of the term, see 
generally, Alan Gilbert, The Return of the Slum: Does Language Matter?, 31 INT’L J. URB. 
& REGIONAL RES. 697, 697 (2007). 
 14 See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE 
SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010); PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION 
ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 (2009); RICHARD D. WOLFF, CAPITALISM HITS THE 
FAN: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC MELTDOWN AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2010); ROBERT 
SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: THE RETURN OF THE MASTER (2009). 
 15 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 252 (2d ed.1996). 
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saturated by legality, contemplate a slum like Dharavi.16  Rather, 
slums emerge as liminal spaces17 where law, extra-legality, and 
illegality are braided to produce the other side of universality—
“moral and legal no man’s land, where universality finds its 
spatial limits.”18 
This article examines the production and persistence of 
urban slums in order to explore and evaluate remedial strategies 
that could ensure adequate housing for the urban poor.  This 
inquiry is informed by the spatial turn in social inquiry that 
deems spatial factors crucial to social phenomena,19 and the 
renewed interest in urban sociology and “the city.”20  It takes 
cognizance of the mutually constitutive roles of law and space,21 
and of the fact that “[w]e live in a time of porous legality or of 
legal porosity, multiple networks of legal orders forcing us to 
constant transitions and trespassings.”22  First, the article 
presents a picture of Dharavi to underscore the complexity and 
gravity of the problem of urban slums.  Second, it articulates a 
theoretical framework to argue that urban slums are produced by 
 
 16 See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC 
SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 74–75 (1999).  See 
generally HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Craig Calhoun ed., 1993); AFTER 
HABERMAS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Nick Crossley & John Michael 
Roberts eds., 2004). 
 17 According to Victor Turner: 
The attributes of liminality or liminal personae (‘threshold people’) are 
necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip 
through the network of classifications that normally locate states and positions 
in cultural space.  Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt 
and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, 
and ceremonial. 
VICTOR TURNER, THE RITUAL PROCESS: STRUCTURE AND ANTI-STRUCTURE 95 (1969). 
 18 Denise Ferreira Da Silva, Towards a Critique of the Socio-logos of Justice: The 
Analytics of Raciality and the Production of Universality, 7 SOC. IDENTITIES 421, 422 
(2001). 
 19 See generally DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY 
INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE (1990); EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN 
GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (1989); SPACE & 
SOCIAL THEORY: INTERPRETING MODERNITY AND POSTMODERNITY (Georges Benko & Ulf 
Strohmayer eds., 1997); PLACE AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY (Michael Keith & Steve 
Pile eds., 1993). 
 20 See, e.g., EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF CITIES AND 
REGIONS xi, xii (2000); ASH AMIN & NIGEL THRIFT, CITIES: REIMAGINING THE URBAN 2–4 
(2002); POSTMODERN CITIES AND SPACES 1 (Sophie Watson & Katherine Gibson eds., 
1995). 
 21 See generally Nicholas K. Blomley, Text and Context: Rethinking the Law-Space 
Nexus, 13 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 512 (1989); NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, 
SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER (1994); Desmond Manderson, Beyond the 
Provincial: Space, Aesthetics, and Modernist Legal Theory, 20 MELB. U. L. REV. 1048 
(1996); Chris Butler, Critical Legal Studies and the Politics of Space, 18 SOC. & LEGAL 
STUD. 313 (2009). 
 22 BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE 
AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 473 (1995). 
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three inter-linked and enduring features of capitalism that have 
been accentuated by neoliberalism: accumulation by dis-
possession, the labor reserve army, and an informal sector of the 
economy.  Third, using the history of slums in India as a case 
study, it applies this framework to demonstrate how colonial 
stratagems, misguided post-colonial development policies, and 
mandates of neoliberalism have produced and sustained slums in 
the global South.  Fourth, it shows how material and discursive 
changes spawned by neoliberalism transformed India’s 
judiciary’s response to the problem of slums and slum-dwellers 
from humane treatment to hostility.  Fifth, it evaluates 
alternative models for the eradication of urban slums in the 
global South, and finds the “state as developer” model23 to be 
most promising.  Finally, it argues that the incipient right to the 
city provides a productive framework to reimagine the concept of 
citizenship, and to guide public policy and popular action to 
ensure adequate housing with dignity for the urban poor and the 
marginalized. 
I.  DHARAVI:  MAXIMUM SLUM IN MAXIMUM CITY 
In India, the number of people living in slums grew 
approximately twenty-five percent in the last decade.24  In 
Mumbai, over twenty million people cram into 169 square miles, 
with population density exceeding one million per square mile in 
some parts of the city.25  With twelve million squatters and 
tenement-dwellers, Mumbai is also the global capital of slum-
dwelling.26  While real estate prices in Mumbai compete with 
those of Manhattan,27 every second person in Mumbai lives in 
slums, which collectively occupy just six percent of all the land in 
the city.28  In Mumbai, a typical tenement chawl—which makes 
up seventy-five percent of the city’s formal housing stock—is a 
dilapidated, one-room rental dwelling that on average crams a 
 
 23 See infra notes 431–459 and accompanying text. 
 24 Bibhudatta Pradhan, India’s Number of Slum-Dwellers Surges as Economy Draws 
People to Cities, BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 3, 2010, 5:06 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2010.09.03/india-s-number-of-slum-dwellers-surges-as-economy-draws-people-to-
cities.html. 
 25  Seamus Murphy, Bombay: Maximum City, VIIPHOTO.COM, 
http://www.viiphoto.com/detailStory.php?news_id=1086 (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
 26 UN-HABITAT, Slums of the World: The Face of Urban Poverty in the New 
Millennium? annex 3 (Monitoring the Millennium Development Goal, Target 11-World-
wide Slum Dweller Estimation Working Paper, Nairobi 2003). 
 27 Gayatri Ramanathan, Dharavi Redevelopment Plan is Robbing Us of Space: 
Residents, LIVEMINT.COM (Sept. 5, 2007, 7:07 AM), http://www.livemint.com/2007/09/ 
05002021/Dharavi-redevelopment-plan-is.html. 
 28 Komal Panchamatia, Every Second Person in Mumbai Resides in Slum: UNDP 
Report, BUSINESS STANDARD (Sep. 4, 2009, 11:25 AM), http://www.business-standard.com/ 
india/news/every-second-person-in-mumbai-resides-in-slum-undp-report/72631/on. 
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household of six people into fifteen square meters, with a latrine 
usually shared by six families.29  Pavement and sidewalk 
dwellers in Mumbai reach approximately one million.30  Of these, 
seventy percent have been in the city for at least six years, and 
one-third have been evicted from a chawl or a slum.31  While 
Mumbai’s estimated annual housing deficit of 45,000 units 
translates into a corresponding increase in slum dwellings, 
400,000 units lie empty because owners loath the mandated 
regime of fixed rents and the resulting propensity of tenants to 
become permanent occupiers.32  Homelessness and slum growth 
in Mumbai is directly related to job losses associated with 
industrial restructuring.  In 1921, textile mills hired 16.2% of the 
males and 9.5% of the females of the city’s population.33  In 1931, 
the Census Commissioner stated that “‘[s]ave for its textile 
manufacture’, . . . ‘Bombay has really little claim to be called an 
industrial city. . . .’.”34  Until 1980, 250,000 textile mill workers 
lived in Mumbai; today the number has fallen below 30,000.35  
This is part of a broader contraction of the formal sector of the 
economy that has forced the urban poor to fend for themselves in 
the so-called informal sector. 
Life in Dharavi demonstrates that, for the urban poor, 
housing is a verb.36  Dharavi, a 175-hector (0.67 square miles) 
maze of dark alleys and corrugated shacks, compacts 18,000 
people per acre into 10-by-15 foot rooms stacked on top of one 
another.37  Here, slum-dwellers juggle housing cost, tenure 
security, quality of shelter, distance from work, and personal 
safety.  Even pavement-dwelling, much less an extra-legal shack, 
is not free; regular fees have to paid to the police, crime 
 
 29 ALAIN R.A. JACQUEMIN, URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND NEW TOWNS IN THE THIRD 
WORLD: LESSONS FROM THE NEW BOMBAY EXPERIENCE 89 (1999). 
 30 Minar Pimple & Lysa John, Security of Tenure: Mumbai’s Experience, in HOLDING 
THEIR GROUND: SECURE LAND TENURE FOR THE URBAN POOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
75, 76, 78 (Alain Durand-Lasserve & Lauren Royston eds., 2002). 
 31 JACQUEMIN, supra note 29, at 90. 
 32 SUKETU MEHTA, MAXIMUM CITY: BOMBAY LOST AND FOUND 117 (2004). 
 33 R. CHANDAVARKAR, THE ORIGINS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM IN INDIA: BUSINESS 
STRATEGIES AND THE WORKING CLASSES IN BOMBAY, 1900–1940 77 (1994). 
 34 Id.  
 35 Sharit K. Bhowmik, The Politics of Urban Space in Mumbai: ‘Citizen’ versus the 
Urban Poor, in CONTESTED TRANSFORMATIONS: CHANGING ECONOMIES AND IDENTITIES IN 
CONTEMPORARY INDIA 149, 151 (Mary E. John et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter CONTESTED 
TRANSFORMATIONS].  The decline of the textile industry in Mumbai resulted from the 
global shift of textile production to comparatively low-wage settings like Bangladesh, 
China, and Vietnam. See Sanjaya Lall, India’s Manufactured Exports: Comparative 
Structure and Prospects, 27 WORLD DEV. 1769, 1769–70 (1999). 
 36 John F. C. Turner, Housing as a Verb, in FREEDOM TO BUILD: DWELLER CONTROL 
OF THE HOUSING PROCESS 148, 151 (John F. C. Turner & Robert Fichter eds., 1972). 
 37 KALPANA SHARMA, REDISCOVERING DHARAVI: STORIES FROM ASIA’S LARGEST SLUM 
18 (2000). 
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syndicates, or both.38  Furthermore, squatters are required to pay 
sizable amounts of money as bribes to the police, politicians, or 
criminal gangs to gain access to the sites, and continue to pay 
informal “rent” in money, loyalty, and votes.39  The unavoidable 
costs of an un-serviced location add to the bill.  Slum-dwellers 
who have been in the city since before 1995 pay a monthly fee to 
the city for a “photo-pass”—an identity card with the photograph 
of the head of the household on it.40  While holders assume that 
this pass gives them a right of permanent residency, the small 
print on the back side states that the holder is an encroacher who 
has to pay a monthly fine.41 
In Dharavi and other slums of Mumbai, death rates are fifty 
percent higher than in adjoining rural areas, with forty percent 
of the mortality being a product of infections and parasitic 
diseases due to contaminated water and inadequate sanitation.42  
“Breathing the air in [Dharavi] now is the equivalent to smoking 
two-and-a-half packs of cigarettes a day.”43  Clean water, 
sanitation, and toilets are rare commodities, which puts special 
burdens on women.44  The few public toilets run by the municipal 
corporation charge for each use.45  A study of twenty-two slums 
in India found nine with no latrines at all; in another ten, only 
nineteen served 102,000 people.46  
Dharavi is also a hub of small-scale industries, with an 
estimated annual turnover between $50 and $100 million.47  
Against all odds, Dharavi has developed into a “kind of self-
sufficient, self-sustaining ‘village,’” one with a “vibrant 
 
 38 Erhard Berner, Learning from Informal Markets: Innovative Approaches to Land 
and Housing Provision, in DEVELOPMENT AND CITIES: ESSAYS FROM DEVELOPMENT 
PRACTICE 226, 233 (David Westendorff & Deborah Eade eds., 2002) [hereinafter Berner, 
Learning from Informal Markets]. 
 39 MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS 38 (2006) [hereinafter DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS]. 
 40 Bhowmik, supra note 35, at 148. 
 41 Id. 
 42 JACQUEMIN, supra note 29, at 90–91. 
 43 MEHTA, supra note 32, at 29. 
 44 See generally UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, SUMMARY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY AND THE GLOBAL 
WATER CRISIS (2006), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR2006_English_ 
Summary.pdf. 
 45 Kalpana Sharma, Mumbai’s Other Half (Countercurrents.org, Kerala, India), Oct. 
17, 2004, available at http://www.countercurrents.org/gender-sharma171004.htm. 
 46 Chatterjee, supra note 7, at 12.  In Mumbai “half the population doesn’t have a 
toilet to shit in, so they shit outside . . . that’s two and a half million kilos of shit each and 
every day.” MEHTA, supra note 32, at 127.  Such lack of privacy presents particular 
problems for women, who often have to wait for the dark of the night to relieve 
themselves. See Loes Schenk-Sandbergen, Women, Water and Sanitation in the Slums of 
Bangalore: A Case Study of Action Research, in LIVING IN INDIA’S SLUMS: A CASE STUDY 
OF BANGALORE 187, 198 (Hans Schenk ed., 2001). 
 47 Mitu Sengupta, Slumdog Millionaire’s Dehumanizing View of India’s Poor, 
COUNTERPUNCH (Feb. 20/22, 2009), http://www.counterpunch.org/sengupta022009.html. 
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community and economy,” which “has achieved a unique informal 
‘self-help’ urban development over the years, without any 
external aid.”48  While bereft of adequate housing, the slum-
dwellers have established “close to 5000 industrial units, 
producing textiles, pottery and leather, and performing services 
like recycling, printing, and steel fabrication.”49  The economic 
activity in Dharavi is “decentralized, human scale, home-based, 
low-tech and labor-intensive . . . pedestrianized, community-
centric, and network-based . . . .  A simplistic re-zoning and 
segregating of these activities . . . would certainly hurt this very 
unique urban form.”50 
Polluting, toxic, and often illegal industries find Dharavi, 
where “Darwin beats Keynes,” attractive.51  Sweatshops 
profitably mine cheap labor under the radar of regulatory 
oversight.52  Writers analogize Dante’s Inferno to portray the 
struggle for survival in slums where poverty, filth, crime, and 
marginalization stalk the daily life of human beings.53  Slum-
dwellers trade away physical security and public health for 
minimal shelter, and suffer environmental degradation including 
filthy water, polluted air, and toxic industrial waste.54  They 
contend with the “garbage dump syndrome,”55 which is “a 
concentration of toxic industrial activities such as metal plating, 
dyeing, rendering, tanning, battery recycling, casting, vehicle 
repair, [and] chemical manufacture.”56  Dharavi, like most slums, 
is located in a disaster-vulnerable, ecologically fragile area, so 
that even a heavy rain can wipe out shelters.57  An omnipresent 
 
 48 Prakash M. Apte, Dharavi: India’s Model Slum, PLANETIZEN (Sept. 29, 2008, 
5:00 AM), http://planetizen.com/node/35269. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Hans Schenk, Urban Fringes in Asia: Markets versus Plans, in REALIGNING 
ACTORS IN AN URBANIZING WORLD: GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS FROM A 
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE 117, 131 (I. S. A. Baud & J. Post eds., 2002). 
 52 SHARMA, supra note 37, at xxxv, 106. 
 53 MICHAEL TAUSSIG, LAW IN A LAWLESS LAND: DIARY OF A LIMPIEZA IN COLUMBIA 
114–15 (2003); DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 49. 
 54 ELLEN BRENNAN, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, POPULATION, 
URBANIZATION, ENVIRONMENT, AND SECURITY: A SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES 12–14 (1999).  
See also DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 128–29. 
 55 GITA DEWAN VERMA, SLUMMING INDIA: A CHRONICLE OF SLUMS AND THEIR 
SAVIOURS 16 (2002); DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 129. 
 56 DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 129. 
 57 See Mohamed Hamza & Roger Zetter, Structural Adjustment, Urban Systems, and 
Disaster Vulnerability in Developing Countries, 15:4 CITIES 291, 291 (1998) (explaining 
that “urban areas are not disaster prone by nature;; rather . . . the structural processes 
which accelerate rapid urbanisation . . . increase the disaster vulnerability of the mass of 
low-income urban dwellers”).  During the twentieth century, more than one hundred 
million homes were destroyed by earthquakes, mostly in slums, tenements districts, and 
poor rural areas. DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 126. 
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threat is fire, accidental or as the result of “hot demolition”—
arson used by landowners to clear out squatters.58 
Recently, the Mumbai city government approved a plan, 
styled “Vision Mumbai,” to create a “world-class city” by 2013.59  
Dharavi, where the land occupied by the slum is estimated to be 
worth $2 billion,60 is a particular target of this plan.61  
Demolitions by bulldozers, supervised by the police and with 
little notice to the residents, is the modus operandi.62  The 
dwelling of the lead child-actor in Slumdog Millionaire proved 
not to be immune to demolition.63  Besides being a violation of 
many international conventions and covenants to which India is 
a party,64 these actions betray class divides, and “the constitutive 
and mutually defining relations between corporeality and the 
metropolis.”65  As one Dharavi resident put it: 
Why wreck the homes and lives of people who have built the city and 
lived in it for decades? . . .  Because from your luxury high-rise 
apartment you don’t want the humiliation of India’s poor in your line 
of vision as you make money and succeed.  Forcing them out is the 
only option.  You simply can’t wish them away.66 
 
 58 See ERHARD BERNER, DEFENDING A PLACE IN THE CITY: LOCALITIES AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR URBAN LAND IN METRO MANILA 144 (1997); HANS SCHENK, Living in 
Bangalore’s Slums, in LIVING IN INDIA’S SLUMS: A CASE STUDY OF BANGALORE, supra note 
46, at 17, 34. 
 59 See generally BOMBAY FIRST & MCKINSEY & CO., VISION MUMBAI: TRANSFORMING 
MUMBAI INTO A WORLD-CLASS CITY (2003), available at www.bombayfirst.org/pdf/ 
McKinseyReport.pdf. 
 60 David Harvey, The Right to the City, 53 NEW LEFT REV. 23, 35 (2008) [hereinafter 
Harvey, The Right to the City]. 
 61 Henry Chu, Where Every Inch Counts, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at A1. 
 62 Habitat Int’l Coal., NGO Appeals Against Slum Demolitions in Mumbai, 
http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article2242 (last visited Sept. 11, 2010). 
 63 Hiram Lee, Home of Slumdog Millionaire Child Actor Destroyed by Mumbai 
Authorities, WORLD SOCIALIST (May 15, 2009), http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/ 
may2009/slum-m15.shtml. 
 64 See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Articles 2 & 
11, Jan. 3, 1976, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cescr.pdf; Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Comments No. 4 on the right to adequate 
housing, and No. 7 on forced evictions, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ 
cescr/comments.htm; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 16, 27 and 39, 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm; Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Article 14, available at http://www.un.org/ 
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm; Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
Development-based Evictions and Displacement, UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate 
Housing of the UN Commission on Human Rights, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/ 
english/issues/housing/docs/guidelines_en.pdf. 
 65 Elizabeth Grosz, Body–Cities, in THE FEMINISM AND VISUAL CULTURE READER 
507, 508 (Amelia Jones ed., 2003). 
 66 Dan McDougall, Waste Not, Want Not in the £700m Slum, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 
2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/mar/04/india.recycling. 
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An architect claims, “[t]here’s very little vision with this 
plan.  They’re more like hallucinations.”67  A Dharavi resident 
asks: “Development for whom?  The government’s idea of 
development doesn’t include us.  I’ve seen the plans.  Wonderful.  
No room at all for ugly poor people.”68  A companion plan adopted 
by the Maharashtra state government proposes to resettle slum-
dwellers of Dharavi into 225 square foot flats per family, if the 
slum-dweller’s name appeared on the voters’ list in 1995 and he 
or she was an actual occupant of the dwelling.69  Together, 
Lehman Brothers and HDIL, one of the largest property 
developers in India, were awarded a contract to implement the 
plan, but they abandoned it citing a liquidity crunch and lack of 
clarity of policy.70  Many earlier plans met a similar fate.  In all, 
slum upgrading plans in Mumbai promised to provide relief to 
three million people, but the results remain dismal.71  An expert 
review concluded that “the scheme for slum upgrading had fallen 
well short of expectations and only nine percent of recipients 
belonged to low-income groups . . . .”72  In the meantime, the 
global real estate price-escalation has also reached Dharavi, 
making even the slum beyond the reach of the destitute.73  A 
Dharavi real estate broker explains: 
Ten years ago, poor people were my only clients and huts my only 
properties . . . .  My only line was: ‘Poor people can afford it.’  Now I 
sell to businessmen, investors and speculators.  I tell them, ‘This place 
is a commercial center.  It’s slap in the middle of the city.  Its [sic] 
development is approved.  It’s a sure thing!  It’s golden!  Get in now!’74 
This picture of Dharavi in Mumbai suggests that most cities 
of the global South are less made of glass and steel soaring 
toward the sky, than of crude brick, straw, scrap wood, and 
plastic in the midst of squalor, pollution, and excrement.  It also 
 
 67 Id. 
 68 Alex Perry, Life in Dharavi: Inside Asia’s Biggest Slum, TIME (Asia), June 19, 
2006, available at http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/501060619/slum.html. 
 69 See Slum Rehabilitation Authority, Dharavi Redevelopment Project, SRA.GOV, 
http://www.sra.gov.in/htmlpages/Dharavi.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2010).  See also 
Kalpana Sharma, A Reprieve for Dharavi, INFOCHANGEINDIA.ORG, 
http://infochangeindia.org/Urban-India/Cityscapes/A-reprieve-for-Dharavi.html (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2010) (outlining recent history of the Dharavi Redevelopment Project, 
including a Maharashta government compromise increasing dwelling size to three 
hundred square feet and extending the voters’ list cut-off date to January 1, 2000). 
 70 Dharavi: ‘Slum’ping Developments, ECONOMIC TIMES (Apr. 2, 2009, 12:07 AM), 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ (click “news” above search box;; enter search term 
“Slum’ping developments”). 
 71 Greg O’Hare et al., A Review of Slum Housing Policies in Mumbai, 15 CITIES 269, 
278 (1998). 
 72 Id. at 279. 
 73 Perry, supra note 68. 
 74 Id. 
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suggests that Dharavi, like other urban slums of the global 
South, is not a space invested with formal legality.  Dharavi 
emerges as a liminal zone of a regulatory vacuum, where 
predatory entrepreneurs, corrupt politicians, and state 
functionaries operate unfettered by law or public scrutiny. 
II.  SLUMS, CITIES, AND CAPITALISM 
A. Accumulation by Dispossession and “Surplus Humanity” 
Slum-dwellers have been characterized as “outcast 
proletariat.”75  They are the “disincorporated” and “un-
incorporatable” of capitalism.76  They stand “condemned to the 
world of the excluded, the redundant, the dispensable, having 
nothing to lose, not even the chains of wage-slavery. . . .  [They 
are] the shadowy figures of the rejected, the marginal, the 
leftovers of capital’s arising, the wreckage and debris . . . .”77  All 
this renders them “structurally and biologically redundant to 
global accumulation and the corporate matrix.”78  Any productive 
inquiry of slums and slum-dwellers must take account of the 
conditions of their production.  Three interlinked historical 
features of capitalism furnish the contours of this process: 
accumulation by dispossession, the reserve army of labor, and the 
informal economy. 
David Harvey coined the term accumulation by dispossession 
to signify that accumulation facilitated by legal and extra-legal 
non-economic means is an enduring condition of capitalism, 
rather than just its historical precondition.79  The construct 
signals that markets always rely on non-market forces, 
particularly legal orders and extra-legality, to disproportionately 
allocate power and resources to owners of capital.80  The concept 
builds on that of primitive accumulation—appropriation of value 
by force—seen as the pre-history of capitalism and critical to the 
development of free labor and free markets.81  As a prerequisite to 
the desired positioning of bodies and spaces, legal and extra-legal 
 
 75 Mike Davis, The Urbanization of Empire: Megacities and the Laws of Chaos, 81 
SOC. TEXT 9, 11 (2004) [hereinafter Davis, The Urbanization of Empire]. 
 76 Id. at 11, 13 (quoting UN HUMAN SETTLEMENT PROGRAM, THE CHALLENGE OF 
SLUMS: GLOBAL REPORT ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 2003) (internal citations omitted). 
 77 KALYAN SANYAL, RETHINKING CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT: PRIMITIVE 
ACCUMULATION, GOVERNMENTALITY & POST-COLONIAL CAPITALISM 53 (2007). 
 78 Davis, The Urbanization of Empire, supra note 75, at 11. 
 79 See DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM 137–38, 145–46 (2003) [hereinafter 
HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM]. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See MICHAEL PERELMAN, THE INVENTION OF CAPITALISM: CLASSICAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMY AND THE SECRET HISTORY OF PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION 13 (2000); Jim 
Glassman, Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession, Accumulation by 
‘Extra-Economic’ Means, 30 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 608, 610 (2006). 
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coercion made capital accumulation possible.82  Coercion 
triggered the genesis of capitalism—availability of “free” labor 
with no other means of livelihood except their labor to be sold in 
a nascent “free” labor market, and the availability of capital to be 
deployed in the incipient manufacturing industries.  Historically, 
the process turned on “ex-novo separation between producers and 
means of production.”83  The key issue here involves the 
“conditions, circumstances and contexts in which this separation 
is enforced.”84  Contrary to the mythologies of classical economics, 
this is a realm outside the market governed by pure economic 
laws—a zone where this separation is effectuated through direct 
extra-economic forces residing in the coercive power of the state 
and the law.85  Two domains of extra-economic power were 
critical to this process: coercive laws that forced subsistence 
producers into the “free” wage labor market, and colonial plunder 
that made capital available for investment. 
Colonialism, facilitated by an elaborate reordering of 
international law, filled the coffers of the fledgling mercantile 
class of Europe and generated the financial resources to engage 
the “freed” labor in production governed by profit maximization.86  
Besides direct plunder of resources in the colonies, agricultural 
lands in the Americas and plantation colonies in the Caribbean 
 
 82 As Polanyi reminded us, “[t]he road to the free market was opened and kept open 
by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled 
interventionism.” KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 146 (2001).  Jessop adds: 
[N]either capitalism as a whole nor the capital-labor relationship on which its 
contradictory and conflictual dynamic depends can be reproduced purely 
through market relations.  Both require supplementary modes of reproduction, 
regulation and governance[,] including those provided in part through the 
operations of the state. 
BOB JESSOP, THE FUTURE OF THE CAPITALIST STATE 11 (2002). 
 83 Massimo De Angelis, Separating the Doing and the Deed: Capital and the 
Continuous Character of Enclosures, 12 HIST. MATERIALISM 57, 63 (2004). 
 84 Id. at 66. 
 85 Polanyi focuses on the role of state power in the commodification of land and 
labor, what he terms “fictitious commodities.” POLANYI, supra note 82, at 71.  He points 
out that capitalism “was submerged in general social relations;; markets were merely an 
accessory feature of an institutional setting controlled and regulated more than ever by 
social authority.” Id. at 70. 
 86 For example, silver from the “New World” roughly tripled Europe’s supply. 
FERNAND BRAUDEL, II CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM, 15TH–18TH CENTURY: THE WHEELS 
OF COMMERCE 198 (Sian Reynolds trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1992) (1979).  For the 
relationship between colonialism and international law, see Antony Anghie, Francisco de 
Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law, in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 89, 
89–91 (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick eds., 1999); Antony Anghie, Finding the 
Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in the Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 2–5 (1999); ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 116–17 (2004); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE 
CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960, at 98–178 
(2002). 
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were the “ghost acres” that relieved output pressures and threats 
of diminishing returns that confronted European agriculture.87  
The genesis of capitalism in un-free labor is reflected in the fact 
that the word capital first came into vogue in the era of capital-
intensive but slave-hungry Antillean sugar plantations.88  The 
Enclosure Acts89 and Game Laws90 in England are examples of 
coercive use of law to dispossess rural farmers, hunters, and 
other subsistence producers, forcing them to seek a livelihood in 
the “free” wage market.  Primitive accumulation thus entailed 
two interlinked processes: direct expropriation of people’s means 
of providing for themselves, and forcing people into wage labor. 
Canonical critical political economy had relegated primitive 
accumulation to the pre-history of capitalism.91  However, later 
 
 87 See NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
WORLD 285 (2008). 
 88 See BRAUDEL, supra note 86, at 232.  Braudel credits the 1770 publication of Anne 
Turgot for the first use of the word capital in the sense of bases for capitalism as a new 
mode of production. See ANNE ROBERT JACQUES TURGOT, REFLECTIONS ON THE 
FORMATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF RICHES (William J. Ashley trans., Augustus M. 
Kelly ed., 1898) (1770). 
 89 See 6 SIR JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1483–
1558, at 650–52 (2003). 
 90 Modern Game Laws that began in England in 1671, severely restricted hunting 
and were part of the effort to cut off large masses of the rural people from one traditional 
means of their livelihood. E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE 
BLACK ACT 94, 99, 207, 261 (1975).  The Waltham Black Acts of 1722 were among the 
earliest of the severe measures to punish poachers. Id.  The scope of the Game Laws 
expanded rapidly. Id.  As a result, by the end of the eighteenth century “[m]eat virtually 
disappeared from the tables of the rural poor.” PHYLLIS DEANE, THE FIRST INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION 42 (1979).  The British courts enforced these laws with shocking ferocity, and 
many poachers were executed under the Black Acts. E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND 
HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 68 (1975).  Between 1820 and 1827, in 
Bedfordshire, “nearly a quarter of those committed were in prison for poaching offences.” 
A. G. L. SHAW, CONVICTS AND THE COLONIES 155 (1966).  Blackstone acknowledged this 
connection, observing: “the only rational footing, upon which we can consider it [violation 
of Games Laws] as a crime, is that in low and indigent persons it promotes idleness, and 
takes them away from their proper employments and callings . . .” 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 174–75 (Univ. of Chicago Press 
2002) (1766).  The Game Laws also prohibited the rural poor from keeping weapons, 
thereby diminishing their ability to resist the onslaught on their means of subsistence.  
Blackstone noted that “[f]or preventing of popular insurrections and resistance to the 
government, by disarming the bulk of the people: which last is a reason oftener meant, 
than avowed, by makers of forest or game laws.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 412 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2002) (1766).  Research confirms 
that the level of exploitation was greatest against those who lacked access to weapons. 
John S. Pettengill, Firearms and the Distribution of Income: A Neo-Classical Model, 13 
REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 1, 1–10 (1981).  One the earliest acts of the French Revolution 
was to repeal the hated Game Laws in France. Michael Perelman, Primitive 
Accumulation from Feudalism to Neoliberalism, 18 CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM 44, 54 
(2007). 
 91 See PERELMAN, supra note 81, at 2.  The portrayal of primitive accumulation by 
critical political economists was marred by historicism, Eurocentricism, and anti-peasant 
prejudice of their milieu. Glassman, supra note 81, at 610–12. 
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scholarship on endemic crises of capitalism,92 the political 
economy of growth,93 dependency theory,94 world systems 
theory,95 accumulation on a world scale,96 and articulation of 
modes of production,97 establishes that primitive accumulation is 
“a basic ontological condition for capitalist production, rather 
than just a historical precondition.”98  As a result, “production of 
value that enters into the circuits of capitalist accumulation 
through parasitization of formally non-capitalist processes is a 
deeply embedded feature of capitalism.”99  These interventions 
underscore the continuing role of coercive political forces in 
underwriting the purportedly extra-political realm of the market.  
They also alert us that capitalism, since its origins is a global 
phenomenon that often co-opts rather than displaces non-
capitalist modes of production, and results in uneven 
development of different geographical zones within its ambit.  
The global geography of capitalism enables this accumulation by 
extra-economic means through a myriad of legal and extra-legal 
regimes that range from global to local, and from formal to 
customary.  These insights highlight that primitive accumulation 
does not lead to complete proletarianization and that non-
proletarian and semi-proletarian labor remains integral to 
capitalism.100 
 
 92 Rosa Luxemburg argued that “the accumulation of capital, seen as an historical 
process, employs force as a permanent weapon, not only at its genesis, but further on 
down to the present day.” ROSA LUXEMBURG, THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL 351 (Agnes 
Schwarzschild trans., Routledge 2003) (1913).  Hannah Arendt emphasized that crises of 
capital necessitate that “the original sin of simple robbery, which centuries ago had made 
possible the ‘original accumulation of capital’ . . . had eventually to be repeated lest the 
motor of accumulation suddenly die down.” HANNAH ARENDT, IMPERIALISM: PART TWO OF 
THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 28 (1968).  David Moore noted that colonized societies 
could not “protect themselves against the ravaging international trade and imperialism 
that destroys precapitalist communities of kinship, neighbourhoods, profession and 
creed . . . all forms of indigenous, organic society.” David Moore, The Second Age of the 
Third World: From Primitive Accumulation to Global Public Goods?, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 
87, 93 (2004). 
 93 See generally PAUL A. BARAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH (1957). 
 94 See generally ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN 
LATIN AMERICA (1969). 
 95 See generally IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY (1979) 
[hereinafter WALLERSTEIN, THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY]. 
 96 See, e.g., SAMIR AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF THE 
THEORY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 38 (1974); SAMIR AMIN, UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT 93 
(1976). 
 97 Aidan Foster-Carter, The Modes of Production Controversy, 107 NEW LEFT REV. 
47, 51 (1978); Harold Wolpe, Introduction, in THE ARTICULATION OF MODES OF 
PRODUCTION: ESSAYS FROM ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1, 5, 9–10 (1980). 
 98 Glassman, supra note 81, at 615. 
 99 Id. at 617. 
 100 WALLERSTEIN, THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY, supra note 95, at 276–78.  As a 
result of articulation of dependent economies with global accumulation and coexistence of 
modes of production, “no matter how universal the process of proletarianization, the 
result is not the creation of a homogeneous proletariat.” HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM, 
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The enduring nature of accumulation by dispossession can be 
seen in the various forms of social capital that are required by 
capital but not paid by it.101  David Harvey initially used the 
phrase “accumulation by dispossession” to signify that global 
primitive accumulation is an enduring “spacio-temporal fix” for 
cyclical crises of capital.102  In this global frame, accumulation by 
dispossession emerges as central to the exercise of colonial and 
imperial domination that has moved from the background to 
become the dominant form of accumulation in the current 
neoliberal era.103  The entire panoply of forms of value extraction 
by means other than commodified or “free” wage labor makes for 
accumulation by dispossession. 
Examples drawn from various contexts should help us 
appreciate this enduring phenomenon.  Publically funded 
infrastructure, subsidies for research and development, public 
education, and public health are canonical instances of non-
market processes that sustain the market.  Gendered and often 
racialized household labor, both productive and reproductive, is 
another pervasive field of such appropriation.104  The history of 
 
supra note 79, at 147.  See also IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE ESSENTIAL WALLERSTEIN 
142–43, 240, 363 (2000). 
 101 Social reproduction entails “the social processes and human relations associated 
with the creation and maintenance of the communities upon which all production and 
exchange rest.” Nancy Hartsock, Globalization and Primitive Accumulation: The 
Contributions of David Harvey’s Dialectical Marxism, in DAVID HARVEY: A CRITICAL 
READER 183, 183 (Noel Castree & Derek Gregory eds., 2006). 
 102 The cyclical crises of under-consumption, over-accumulation, and falling rates of 
profit, endemic to capitalism, necessitate spatial and temporal solutions.  Spatio-temporal 
fix is “a metaphor for a particular kind of solution to capitalist crises through temporal 
deferral and geographical expansion.” HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM, supra note 79, at 
115.  The spatial fix derives from capitalism’s drive to resolve its crisis tendencies by 
geographical expansion and geographical restructuring.  This includes developing 
external markets, exporting surplus capital, and expanding the labor-pool available for 
engagement in accumulation of capital.  The temporal fix involves expropriation of 
resources from a commons for short-term profit where the rate of economic exploitation of 
a given resource exceeds its natural rate of renewal and/or the absorptive capacity of the 
environment. See Bob Jessop, Spatial Fixes, Temporal Fixes and Spatio-Temporal Fixes, 
in DAVID HARVEY: A CRITICAL READER, supra note 101, 142, 142–43. 
 103 HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM, supra note 79, at 140–42, 149–50, 153, 172. 
 104 See Claude Meillassoux, From Reproduction to Production: A Marxist Approach to 
Economic Anthropology, 1 ECON. & SOC’Y 93, 100–02 (1972); CLAUDE MEILLASSOUX, 
MAIDENS, MEALS AND MONEY: CAPITALISM AND THE DOMESTIC COMMUNITY xii–xiii (1981); 
Nona Y. Glazer, Servants to Capital: Unpaid Domestic Labor and Paid Work, 16 REV. 
RADICAL POL. ECON. 61, 61 (1984); Carmen Diana Deere, Rural Women’s Subsistence 
Production in the Capitalist Periphery, 8 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 9, 9 (1976); Lourdes 
Beneria, Reproduction, Production, and the Sexual Division of Labour, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. 
ECON. 203, 203 (1979); J. K. GIBSON-GRAHAM, THE END OF CAPITALISM (AS WE KNEW IT): 
A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 33–34 (1996); ALTHA J. CRAVEY, WOMEN 
AND WORK IN MEXICO’S MAQUILADORAS 6–7 (1998); Cindy Katz, On the Grounds of 
Globalization: A Topography for Feminist Political Engagement, 26 J. WOMEN CULTURE & 
SOC’Y 1213, 1219 (2001); Cindy Katz, Vagabond Capitalism and the Necessity of Social 
Reproduction, 33 ANTIPODE 709, 710–13 (2001). 
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agricultural labor in California, saturated by the instrumental 
use of race, class, and nationality in immigration and land-
ownership laws that consolidated agro-capital, is also a story of 
accumulation by dispossession.105  Finally, trade regimes that 
entail “neoliberal rescaling of governance to escape national-scale 
environmental constraints,”106 and new appropriation of the 
commons for private profit whereby “the global commons are 
being enclosed,”107 are instances of accumulation by dis-
possession. 
One specific result of accumulation by dispossession that is 
central to the production of slums is the emergence of a reserve 
army of labor.  While dispossession destroys traditional 
entitlements and subsistence economies and estranges direct 
producers from their means of labor, all those dislocated are not 
absorbed in the new production process.108  This unabsorbed 
labor may be “free,” but it is suspended between the shrinking 
subsistence economy and the volatile formal markets.  This 
unabsorbed labor is the so-called surplus humanity and includes: 
 
 105 Agricultural employers “used one group after another, in a vast, repetitive cycle of 
recruitment, employment, exploitation, and expulsion.” RICHARD A. WALKER, THE 
CONQUEST OF BREAD: 150 YEARS OF AGRIBUSINESS IN CALIFORNIA 66–74 (2004).  Since 
the Civil War, California’s agricultural labor was recycled and displaced with the bulk 
furnished serially by European immigrants, the Chinese, the Japanese, Filipinos, 
Mexicans, and undocumented workers. Id.  The cycle of labor rotation prevented workers 
from securing better wages and more rights.  The extra-economic measures to orchestrate 
this cycle included the Chinese Exclusion Acts of 1882, 1892, and 1902, the 1917 
Immigration Act, the bracero program, and the 1965 Immigration Reform Act.  One 
should include here other extra-economic developments like breakdown of the late Q’ing 
era regime in China, the U.S. colonization of the Philippines, and the Mexican Revolution. 
Id. 
 106 James McCarthy, Privatizing Conditions of Production: Trade Agreements as 
Neoliberal Environmental Governance, 35 GEOFORUM 327, 330–32 (2004).  McCarthy sees 
this as a reinforcement of the neoliberal “regulatory takings” thesis “that completely 
unencumbered, asocial private property is the norm and that the state must pay its 
citizens for any exercise of its governance powers.” Id.  Legal regimes of agreements, such 
as NAFTA, inscribe private rights to surplus value by reinforcing public responsibility for 
externalities generated by private appropriation. Id.  One specific instance is global legal 
regimes that force governments to reimburse capital interests for any costs that 
environmental protection legislation may entail. Id.  In this schema, environmental 
protection is construed as a barrier to trade and penalized or struck down. Id. 
 107 Hartsock, supra note 101, at 176.  At play here is the enforcement of ever-
expanding intellectual property rights, depletion of global environmental commons, 
privatization of public assets and services, and rollback of regulatory frameworks 
governing the commons. HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM, supra note 79, at 146–48. 
 108 It is the foundation of Keynesian critique of classical economics that capitalism 
does not produce any automatic tendency toward full employment. See JOHN MAYNARD 
KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY (1936); Thomas I. 
Palley, From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism: Shifting Paradigms in Economics, in 
NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER 20, 20–23 (Alfredo Saad-Filho & Deborah Johnston 
eds., 2005) [hereinafter Palley, From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism]; SKIDELSKY, supra 
note 14. 
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People who have lost their subsistence outside the cash 
economy . . . [who] are neither members of the economy, nor are they 
capable of living, feeling and acting as they did before they lost the 
support of a moral economy of subsistence.  The new category of 
economic cripples, thus defined, may in fact survive, but they do not 
fully partake of the characteristics of homo economicus . . . any choice 
between alternative satisfactions, which is implied in the concept of 
economic need, is ruled out for them.109 
What do those who cannot fully partake of the characteristics of 
homo economicus do while suspended in the “imaginary waiting 
room of history?”110  They tend to their subsistence needs as best 
as they can by exchanging needs and capacities in networks of 
barter, petty trade, and casual employment under the radar of 
the law.  The result is the emergence of a “need economy”111—a 
zone outside the formal legal frames of contract and regulation, 
signifying “[i]nformalization within the accumulation 
economy.”112  This is the zone of the so-called informal economy.  
While ostensibly “‘discovered’ in Africa in the early 1970s,”113 the 
informal economy has been a perennial and enduring companion 
of the formal capitalist economy.  Its emergence was 
contemporaneous with the emergence of capitalism, and it 
endures as capitalism persists.  This is the context of the 
emergence of a reserve army of labor—populations separated 
from their non-capitalist means of subsistence but not integrated 
into the productive circuits of wage labor on a stable basis.  The 
reserve army 
arises out of the very nature of capitalist accumulation, and the 
surplus population that constitutes the reserve army resides within 
rather than outside the domain of the capitalist mode of production.  
Unemployment and pauperism is the mirror image of 
employment . . . —an appendage that is brought into being and 
reproduced by the capitalist mode of production itself.114 
Economists recognize that some measure of unemployment 
plays a crucial role in a market economy.115  They speak of the 
 
 109 Ivan Illich, Need, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY 88, 94 (Wolfgang Sachs ed., 
1997). 
 110 DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND 
HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE 8 (2000). 
 111 SANYAL, supra note 77, at 208–15. 
 112 Id. at 237. 
 113 Martha Alter Chen, Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal 
Economy and Formal Regulatory Environment 1–2 (Expert Grp. on Dev. Issues, Research 
Paper No. 2005/10, 2005). 
 114 SANYAL, supra note 77, at 54. 
 115 The unemployed serve as an instrument of economic and political control over the 
working class.  They can serve as a backlog of strikebreakers during boom times, be 
expelled during downturns, and then are reabsorbed in the next upward cycle.  When a 
capitalist economy grows rapidly and the reserve army of the unemployed is depleted, 
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“natural rate” of unemployment, and its offspring—the non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment,”116 and the “labor 
force reserve.”117  The reserve army of labor helps to contain 
significant wage increases and corresponding decline of profits.118  
This dovetails with disciplinary uses of the poor and the 
underclass in the market system.119  Formation of the reserve 
army is often augmented by regional inequalities, racial divides 
and rural-urban migration.120  Economists of all stripes recognize 
that the question of employment is not simply a matter of a “free” 
labor market, and that public policy plays a critical role in 
calibrating and managing unemployment.121  Fiscal and 
 
workers utilize their increased bargaining power to demand raises in wages and 
distribution of income in their favor.  Profits are put under pressure.  This leads to 
reduction in investment, a fall in employment, and a replenishment of the reserve army of 
the unemployed. See Robert Pollin, The “Reserve Army of Labor” and the “Natural Rate of 
Unemployment”: Can Marx, Kalecki, Friedman, and Wall Street All Be Wrong?, 30 REV. 
OF RADICAL POL. ECON. 1, 4 (1998); Fred Magdoff & Harry Magdoff, Disposable Workers: 
Today’s Reserve Army of Labor, 55 MONTHLY REV. 18, 21 (2004). 
 116 See WENDY CARLIN & DAVID SOSKICE, MACROECONOMICS AND THE WAGE BARGAIN: 
A MODERN APPROACH TO EMPLOYMENT, INFLATION AND THE EXCHANGE RATE 5 (1990); 
THE NATURAL RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT: REFLECTIONS ON 25 YEARS OF THE HYPOTHESIS 
(Rod Cross ed., 1995). 
 117 The Labor Reserve Force is “an estimate of the deviation of the actual labor force 
from the labor force that would be observed if the economy was continuously at full 
employment.” Wayne Vroman, The Labor Force Reserve: A Re-estimate, 9 INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS: J. ECON. & SOC’Y 379, 379 (2008). 
 118 David M. Gordon, Six-Percent Unemployment Ain’t Natural: Demystifying the Idea 
of a Rising “Natural Rate of Unemployment,” 54 SOC. RES. 223, 233–34 (1987); David M. 
Gordon, The Un-Natural Rate of Unemployment: An Econometric Critique of the NAIRU 
Hypothesis, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 117, 122 (1988). 
 119 See Herbert J. Gans, Positive Functions of the Undeserving Poor: Uses of the 
Underclass in America, 22 POL. & SOC’Y. 269, 272–73 (1994); Miles S. Kimball, Labor-
Market Dynamics When Unemployment is a Worker Discipline Device, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 
1045, 1049 (1994). 
 120 See Doreen Massey, Regionalism: Some Current Issues, 6 CAP. & CLASS 106, 114 
(1978); Richard Peet, Inequality and Poverty: A Marxist-Geographic Theory, 65 ANNALS 
ASS’N. AM. GEOGRAPHERS 564, 567 (1975); Richard A. Walker, Two Sources of Uneven 
Development Under Advanced Capitalism: Spatial Differentiation and Capital Mobility, 
10 REV RADICAL POL. ECON. 28, 31 (1978).  For mainstream theories of rural-urban 
migration, see MICHAEL P. TODARO & STEPHEN C. SMITH, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 335–
37 (2006). 
 121 See KEYNES, supra note 108; Palley, From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism, supra 
note 108.  Michal Kalecki was the first to clearly state, in an appropriately titled chapter, 
“Political Aspects of Full Employment,” that while a capitalist economy can be sustained 
at full employment, this is the case only if challenges to capitalists’ social and political 
hegemony can be contained by means of public policy. MICHAL KALECKI, SELECTED 
ESSAYS ON THE DYNAMICS OF THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY 138–45 (1971).  The “challenge” 
was to devise a “solution,” even if a fascist one, to capitalism’s unemployment problem 
whereby workers would have jobs, but they would not be permitted to exercise the 
political and economic power that would otherwise accrue to them in a full-employment 
economy. Pollin, supra note 115, at 5.  Even Milton Friedman, the veritable advocate of 
the “free market,” admitted that: 
[B]y using the term “natural” rate of unemployment, I do not mean to suggest 
that it is immutable and unchangeable.  On the contrary, many of the market 
characteristics that determine its level are man-made and policy-made.  In the 
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monetary policies are the primary instruments of this 
calibration.122  Such instrumental use of policy does not mean 
that concessions won by the working classes are not the results of 
their struggles.  For example, Keynesian welfare systems like the 
New Deal in the United States were a response to the endemic 
crises of capitalism and popular struggles for security of 
employment and a better quality of life.123  As Polanyi eloquently 
put it: “Laissez-faire was planned; planning was not.”124 
Since the late 1970s, a neoliberal counter-revolution has 
been afoot on a global scale.  This has accelerated accumulation 
by dispossession, enlarged the surplus army of labor, and 
expanded the informal sectors of economies.  Neoliberalism is an 
ensemble of interconnected ideas and practices.  It rests on a 
theory of capitalist market fundamentalism—markets are 
optimal and self-regulating, and if allowed to function without 
restraint, they optimally serve all economic needs, efficiently 
utilize all resources, and generate full employment for 
everyone.125  It mandates tight fiscal and monetary policies, 
unbridled private property rights, unencumbered markets, and 
free trade.126  It is an ideology of the market and private interests 
as opposed to state intervention to safeguard collective 
 
United States, for example, legal minimum wage rates, the Walsh-Healy and 
Davis-Bocon Acts, and the strength of labor unions all make the natural rate of 
unemployment higher than it would otherwise be. 
Milton Friedman, The Role of Monetary Policy, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 7, 9 (1968).  In the 
absence of state intervention, employment depended on the confidence of the capital, 
which gave the latter 
a powerful indirect control over Government policy: everything which may 
shake the state of confidence must be carefully avoided because it would cause 
an economic crisis.  But once the Government learns the trick of increasing 
employment by its own purchases, this powerful controlling device loses its 
effectiveness. 
KALECKI, supra note 121, at 139. 
 122 Calibration of unemployment has a parallel in the “[l]aw of [r]acial [t]hermo-
dynamics,” in which law serves as a type of thermostat assuring that the system contains 
just the right amount of racism: too much would be destabilizing; too little would forfeit 
valuable pecuniary and psychic profits. Richard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: 
Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95, 105–06 (1990). 
 123 POLANYI, supra note 82, at 23. 
 124 Id. at 147. 
 125 See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 64–65 (2007); SKIDELSKY, 
supra note 14, at 105; Costas Lapavitsas, Mainstream Economics in the Neoliberal Era, in 
NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER, supra note 108, at 30, 30–40; Gerard Dumenil & 
Dominique Levy, The Neoliberal (Counter-) Revolution, in NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL 
READER, supra note 108, at 9; William I. Robinson & Jerry Harris, Towards a Global 
Ruling Class? Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class, 64 SCI. & SOC’Y 11, 
41 (2000); DAVID HARVEY, THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL AND THE CRISES OF CAPITALISM 10 
(2010). 
 126 See Palley, From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism, supra note 108, at 25; Anwar 
Shaikh, The Economic Mythology of Neoliberalism, in NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL 
READER, supra note 108, at 41, 41–49. 
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interests.127  It envisages the state as limited to minimal 
executive and juridical functions that are necessary to secure 
private property rights and to support freely functioning 
markets.128  By extension, neoliberalism deems globalization of 
free markets as the best way to extend these benefits to the 
whole world.129 
The neoliberal project aims to unfold a new social order 
across the globe to reverse the setbacks that the economic power 
and political hegemony of the wealth-owning classes had suffered 
on account of Keynesian welfare in the West, socialism in 
Eastern Europe, and nationalism in the global South.130  
Neoliberalism makes increasing recourse to the law to displace 
Keynesian welfare states through liberalization, deregulation, 
and privatization, and uses the discipline of expanded markets to 
remove barriers to accumulation that earlier democratic gains 
had achieved.131  To secure unfettered rights to private property 
and profits, it expands and deepens the logic of the market, 
collapses the distinctions between culture and economy, 
undermines state sovereignty and national autonomy, and links 
local and global political economies to facilitate transnational 
accumulation of capital.132  Through new regimes of trade, 
finance, and property rights, the sovereignty of states transfers 
to international institutions dominated by hegemonic states.133  
 
 127 David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 610 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 22, 22 (2007) [hereinafter Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction]. 
 128 See Simon Clarke, The Neoliberal Theory of Society, in NEOLIBERALISM: A 
CRITICAL READER, supra note 108, at 50, 50–59; Susanne MacGregor, The Welfare State 
and Neoliberalism, in NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER, supra note 108, at 142–48. 
 129 See HA-JOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE 
SECRET HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 28 (2008); HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 15 (2002); Matthew Sparke, 
American Empire and Globalization: Postcolonial Speculations on Neocolonial Enframing, 
24 SINGAPORE J. TROPICAL GEOGRAPHY 373, 379 (2003). 
 130 See DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE 
BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN 
WORLD 10 (1998); Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, supra note 127, at 32. 
 131 For an articulation of the case for neoliberal global political economy and related 
accounts of the law, see ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND 
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 237 (1984); Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The 
Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401 (2000). 
 132 See Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Towards a 
Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J. LAW & SOC’Y 279, 293–94 (1987); A. CLAIRE CUTLER, 
PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE 
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 244–46 (2003); WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, A THEORY OF GLOBAL 
CAPITALISM: PRODUCTION, CLASS, AND STATE IN A TRANSNATIONAL WORLD 101–03 (2004); 
William I. Robinson, Capitalist Globalization and the Transnationalization of the State, in 
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 210, 211–12 (Mark Rupert & Hazel Smith 
eds., 2002). 
 133 See B. S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in 
the Making, 15 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 1, 12–13 (2004).  The exponential rise of extra-
territorial jurisdiction in unilateral and multilateral forms has become an avenue to 
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The hidden hand of the market continues to work in concert with 
the iron fist of the state in the service of accumulation by 
dispossession.  Explosive growth of slums and slum-dwellers is a 
direct result. 
Neoliberalism does not displace the state as much as it 
reformulates it and restructures its options.134  The neoliberal 
project is to turn the “nation-state” into a “market-state,”135 one 
with the primary agenda of facilitating global capital 
accumulation unburdened by any legal regulations aimed at 
assuring the welfare of citizens.  Social formations in the global 
South, situated in an asymmetrical relationship with global 
capitalism, are a particular target of this project.  The neoliberal 
 
govern matters beyond international territorial boundaries by reaching deeply inside 
domestic jurisdiction of states and enforcing the neoliberal agenda upon reluctant states 
in the global South.  The United States, for example, increasingly uses certification 
mechanisms “to create law for other States and to monitor its observance, while the 
United States itself remains unbound and unmonitored.” Nico Krisch, More Equal than 
the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance in International Law, in UNITED 
STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135, 160–61 (Michael 
Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003).  This combines with “substantivism” in U.S. courts 
where “a choice-of-law methodology . . . is to select the better law in any given case.” 
Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Substance, 42 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 931, 957 (2002).  This results in “over-application of U.S. law” in international 
disputes, and acts “as a lever of forcing convergence . . . outside the political process that 
generally structures the harmonization movement.” Id. at 966, 972.  See also JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 475–77 (2000) (showing 
how this has impacted the fields of banking, securities regulation, civil aviation, cyber 
law).  The multilateral form is exemplified by the WTO’s compulsory jurisdiction over 
disputes that lie within its extensive regimes which opens the door for unilateral 
prescriptions and measures related to trade and environmental policies of states in the 
global South. See, e.g., World Trade Org., Report of the Appellate Body, United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of 
DSU by Malaysia (Oct. 22, 2001).  See also B.S. Chimni, WTO and Environment: 
Legitimisation of Unilateral Trade Sanctions, ECO. & POL. WEEKLY 133, 133–38 (2002) 
[hereinafter Chimni, WTO and Environment]; B. S. Chimni, India and Ongoing Review of 
WTO Dispute Settlement System, 37 ECON. & POL. WEEKLY 264, 265 (1999).  Increasingly, 
courts of the global South are deemed unsuitable for adjudicating claims against 
multinational corporations, thus creating “new national frontiers of responsibility for the 
conduct of global capital.” Upendra Baxi, Mass Torts, Multinational Enterprise Liability 
and Private International Law, 276 RECUEIL DES COURS 297, 312 (1999).  See also Hu 
Zhenjie, Forum Non Conveniens: An Unjustified Doctrine, 48 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 143, 159 
(2001); Michael Anderson, Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is 
Tort Law the Answer?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 399, 402 (2002). 
 134 Many perceptive observers reject the “state shrinking and declining” argument as 
political posturing of neo-liberals.  In particular, they point to the expansion of the 
coercive apparatuses of the state and the shift of the state from a managerial mode 
befitting the Fordist era toward a neoliberal entrepreneurial mode. See, e.g., David 
Harvey, From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban 
Governance in Late Capitalism, 71 (B) GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER (SPECIAL ISSUE) 3, 9 
(1989). 
 135 Anthony Carty, Marxism and International Law: Perspectives for the American 
(Twenty-First) Century?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFT: RE-EXAMINING MARXIST 
LEGACIES 169, 170 (Susan Marks ed., 2008) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE 
LEFT]. 
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regimes, with their bedrock principles of private property rights 
and free trade, are a coercive mechanism to get states in the 
global South to adopt neoliberal economic and social policy 
frames conducive to global capital.136  The enabling mechanism is 
“[t]he extension of the normative force of international standards 
by the device of conditionality.”137  These regimes advance 
particular understandings of development and poverty that 
“disregard[] the social context of provision, the lived experiences 
of the poor and dismiss[] and/or reinforce[] the way in which 
deprivations are constituted.”138  The mandate is to privatize 
public assets, roll back social services, and allow unbridled 
mobility of capital.139  Now “[s]trait-jacketed within the global 
logic of capital and market and the global regime of property 
rights,” states in the global South “can no longer act as 
developmental states and engage in management of poverty on 
their own.”140  Instead, non-state actors representing interests of 
global capital play an active role in designing legal orders that 
circumscribe state sovereignty and autonomy.141  Mandates of 
privatization make education, health, infrastructure, utilities, 
housing, and a range of state enterprises available for private 
appropriation.142  By its insistence on the rollback of the state, 
 
 136 These regimes include the WTO multilateral agreements including the Agreement 
on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the Agreement on Trade Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMS), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the 
Agreement establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and 
bilateral investment protection treaties (BITS).  Together these regimes provide global 
capital ease of entry and investment, protection from national performance requirements, 
protection of expansive intellectual property rights, generous compensation in case of 
expropriation, insurance against non-economic risks, and mechanisms to avoid national 
laws and dispute resolution fora. See Chimni, WTO and Environment, supra note 133, at 
138. 
 137 Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of 
Norm Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 207, 212 (Michael Byers ed., 2000). 
 138 Richard Higgott & Heloise Weber, GATS in Context: Development, an Evolving lex 
marcatoria and the Doha Agenda, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 435, 436 (2005). 
 139 For a detailed account of how the interests of the global South are jeopardized by 
concentration of finance capital and monetary regimes of the IMF, see JOSEPH E. 
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 89–104 (2003). 
 140 SANYAL, supra note 77, at 77. 
 141 See generally GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE xiv–xv (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).  
The exponential expansion of international commercial arbitration has created a space for 
private justice to serve global capital at the expense of the state. See Buxbaum, supra 
note 133, at 938–39. 
 142 GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 141, at 147–49, 159–60.  See also 
David A. McDonald, Environmental Racism and Neoliberal Disorder in South Africa, in 
THE QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF 
POLLUTION 255, 270–74 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 2005); Daniel R. Faber & Deborah 
McCarthy, Neo-liberalism, Globalization and the Struggle for Ecological Democracy: 
Linking Sustainability and Environmental Justice, in JUST SUSTAINABILITIES: 
DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 38, 40, 51 (Julian Agyeman et al. eds., 2003). 
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privatization becomes “[t]he [c]utting [e]dge of [a]ccumulation by 
[d]ispossession.”143 
Rapid urban growth triggered by globalized economic 
circuits, along with diminished state capacities and resulting 
civil strife, is the recipe for mushrooming slums in the global 
South.144  The unprecedented urban expansion fueled by 
deregulated financial capital produced another bout of “[c]reative 
[d]estruction”145  where the marginalized and underprivileged 
bear the brunt.  Destruction of traditional rural economies, 
restructuring of the agricultural sector, and deeper penetration 
of market forces into rural societies, accelerated migration of 
uprooted rural farmers to urban areas.146  As interests of global 
finance capital took precedence over survival needs of the poor, 
the impact on the vulnerable was quick, and the “main single 
cause of increases in poverty and inequality during the 1980s and 
1990s was the retreat of the state.”147  A United Nations Human 
Development Report found that “[a]n unprecedented number of 
countries saw development slide backwards in the 1990s.  In 
forty-six countries people are poorer today than in 1990.  In 
twenty-five countries more people go hungry today than a decade 
ago.”148  While “burdens of survival” increased for all poor, “those 
of women are even greater.”149 
 
 143 HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM, supra note 79, at 157–58. 
 144 For a detailed study of rapid urbanization over the last thirty years, see Frederick 
van der Ploeg & Steven Poelhekke, Globalization and the Rise of Mega-Cities in the 
Developing World, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS, ECON. & SOC’Y. 477, 484–85 (2008). 
 145 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82–84 (4th 
ed. 1952). 
 146 See LORI ANN THRUPP WITH GILLES BERGERON & WILLIAM F. WATERS, 
BITTERSWEET HARVESTS FOR GLOBAL SUPERMARKETS: CHALLENGES IN LATIN AMERICA’S 
AGRICULTURAL EXPORT BOOM 1–5 (1995); JOHN MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR TRADE: HOW THE 
POOR PAY FOR FREE TRADE 2–4 (2000); Terence J. Byres, Neoliberalism and Primitive 
Accumulation in Less Developed Countries, in NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER, supra 
note 108, at 83, 83–90; JAN BREMAN, FOOTLOOSE LABOUR: WORKING IN INDIA’S INFORMAL 
ECONOMY 1–2 (1996); JAN BREMAN & ARVIND N. DAS, DOWN AND OUT: LABOURING UNDER 
GLOBAL CAPITALISM 8 (2000); JAN BREMAN, WAGE HUNTERS AND GATHERERS: SEARCH FOR 
WORK IN THE URBAN AND RURAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH GUJARAT 8–9 (1994); Carmen G. 
Gonzalez, Genetically Modified Organisms and Justice: The International Environmental 
Justice Implications of Biotechnology, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 583, 602 (2007). 
 147 UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS, supra note 10, at 43. 
 148 UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004 132 
(2004). 
 149 See Sumati Nair & Preeti Kirbat with Sarah Sexton, A Decade After Cairo: 
Women’s Health in a Free Market Economy, THE CORNER HOUSE (June 16, 2004), 
http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/decade-after-cairo; U. Kalpagam, Coping with 
Urban Poverty in India, 17 BULL. OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS 18 (1985); Fantu 
Cheru, Debt, Adjustment and the Politics of Effective Response to HIV/AIDS in Africa, 
23:2 THIRD WORLD Q. 299, 300–01 (2002); Jeemol Unni, Gender and Informality in Labor 
Market in South Asia, 36:26 ECO. & POL. WKLY. 2360, 2360–63 (2001). 
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Liberalization and deregulation of economies have also 
accelerated urban occupational marginality, with the result that 
those engaged in the informal sector now constitute two-fifths of 
the economically active population of the developing countries.150  
“The International Labour Organization estimates that informal 
workers comprise over half the workforce in Latin America, over 
70 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa and over 80 per cent in 
India . . . .”151  Across the global South, mega-slums “have become 
a dumping ground for a surplus population working in unskilled, 
unprotected and low-wage informal service industries and 
trade.”152  Rural and urban areas are being sutured in production 
networks to accelerate siphoning of value.153  As outsourcing and 
flexible production shrink the regulated formal economy, the 
informal shadow economy becomes the only hope and source of 
livelihood for the urban poor.  The explosive expansion of the 
unregulated informal sector, with its particular burdens on 
women is “a direct function of liberalization.”154  Over the last 
twenty years, both the informal economies and the number of 
slum-dwellers have grown exponentially.155  In India, as in most 
of the global South, significant employment growth has resulted 
from subcontracting at a global scale and the use of casual or 
 
 150 UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS, supra note 10, at 46, 103–04 (2003).  
Note here that many working in the informal sector are a hidden workforce of the formal 
economy.  Outsourcing and subcontracting networks enable the value created by the 
informal sector to be funneled into the profit margins of the formal sector, while any 
expectation of “upward mobility” in the informal sector remains a “myth inspire by 
wishful thinking.” JAN BREMAN, THE LABOURING POOR IN INDIA: PATTERNS OF 
EXPLOITATION, SUBORDINATION, AND EXCLUSION 173–74 (2003). 
 151 Jan Breman, Myth of the Global Safety Net, 59 NEW LEFT REV. 29, 29 (2009). 
 152 UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF THE SLUMS, supra note 10, at 46.  Women make 
up ninety percent of the workers in Free Trade Zones, notorious for dismal working 
conditions, low wages, and absence of workers’ rights. Id. at 40; WOMEN’S EDGE 
COALITION, THE EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON JAMAICA’S POOR: AN ANALYSIS OF 
AGRICULTURE AND SERVICES 31 (2004).  Privatization and erasure of trade barriers led to 
widespread deindustrialization and decimation of formal-sector jobs that traditionally 
employed men.  This has increasingly forced poor women into unregulated and low-paying 
informal sector as pieceworkers, vendors, and providers of low-end services. See Caroline 
O. N. Moser, Adjustment from Below: Low-Income Women, Time and the Triple Role in 
Guayaquil, Ecuador, in ‘VIVA’: WOMEN AND POPULAR PROTEST IN LATIN AMERICA 173, 
180–82 (Sarah A. Radcliffe & Sallie Westwood eds., 1993); Nazneen Kanji, Gender, 
Poverty and Economic Adjustment in Harare, Zimbabwe, 7 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 37, 37, 
39, 46–48 (1995). 
 153 See PETER J. TAYLOR, WORLD CITY NETWORK: A GLOBAL URBAN ANALYSIS 60–61 
(2004); John Friedmann, Where We Stand: A Decade of World City Research, in WORLD 
CITIES IN A WORLD–SYSTEM 21, 21, 33, 41 (Paul L. Knox & Peter J. Taylor eds., 1995); 
Julie Skurski & Fernando Coronil, Country and City in a Postcolonial Landscape: Double 
Discourse and the Geo-Politics of Truth in Latin America, in VIEWS BEYOND THE BORDER 
COUNTRY: RAYMOND WILLIAMS AND CULTURAL POLITICS 231, 232–33 (Dennis L. Dworkin 
& Leslie G. Roman eds., 1993). 
 154 UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS, supra note 10, at 40. 
 155 Id. at 6, 11. 
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self-employed workers” in the informal sector.156  By curtailing 
the already anemic role of the state in housing supply, neoliberal 
policies have proven to be “an inevitable recipe for the mass 
production of slums.”157  Analysts also find that “mega-slums 
are . . . functional to neoliberal global capitalism and a product 
not just of its turmoil but of its turmoil as organized by its 
banking and financial market system.”158  As the warehouses of 
workers of the informal sector, mega-slums facilitate “flexible 
production,” a hallmark of neoliberal global economy. 
If accumulation through dispossession—an enduring 
ontological feature of capitalism—and its byproducts, the reserve 
army of labor and the informal sector, produce and sustain 
modern urban slums and slum-dwellers, what accounts for the 
genesis of the spatial zones of their existence? 
B. Cities of Capital and Liminal Zones 
The spatial production of slums is a symbiotic companion of 
urbanization under capitalism that has followed two models, 
unplanned and planned growth, with differing measures of 
overlap.  Historically, the unplanned urban growth model 
unfolded parallel with industrialization and produced spaces 
where labor and capital came together and goods and services 
circulated rapidly.  The process was far from orderly.  The 
“creative destruction” of capitalism forced rapid relocations of 
habitation as rural populations moved to emerging centers of 
extraction, manufacturing, and commerce.159  As urban centers 
grew in a laissez faire regime, so did slums as the abode of the 
destitute and the lumpenproletariate—the surplus humanity.160  
Dublin,161 Manchester,162 London,163 and Naples164 furnished 
 
 156 Patralekha Chatterjee, Shadow Lives: Urban India’s Informal Economy, 5 
HABITAT DEBATE 19, 20 (1999). 
 157 UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS, supra note 10, at 11. 
 158 Christopher Rude, The Role of Financial Discipline in Imperial Strategy, in THE 
EMPIRE RELOADED 82, 105 n.10 (Leo Panitch & Colin Leys eds., 2004). 
 159 SCHUMPETER, supra note 145, at 83; Josef Gugler, Introduction, in CITIES IN THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD 109, 109 (1997). 
 160 The first published definition of a slum in 1812 held it synonymous with “racket” 
or “criminal activity.” JACINTA PRUNTY, DUBLIN SLUMS 1800–1925: A STUDY IN URBAN 
GEOGRAPHY 2 (1998).  By late nineteenth century, a slum was characterized as an area of 
“dirty back streets, especially such streets as are inhabited by a squalid and criminal 
population.” CARROLL D. WRIGHT, THE SLUMS OF BALTIMORE, CHICAGO, NEW YORK, AND 
PHILADELPHIA 11–13 (1970).  The definition adopted by the United Nations is restricted to 
the “physical and legal characteristics of the settlement,” and eschews the more difficult-
to-measure “social dimensions.” UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS, supra note 10, 
at 12–13. 
 161 See PRUNTY, supra note 160. 
 162 See STEVEN MARCUS, ENGELS, MANCHESTER, AND THE WORKING CLASS 3, 10–11, 
184–85 (1974). 
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early examples of this model of urban growth and the emergence 
of slums. 
Planned urbanization proves particularly attractive to 
finance capital because this unavoidably state-sponsored and 
debt-financed activity gives speculative capital security of 
accumulation without getting directly involved with the 
politically volatile terrain of industrial production.  The first 
prototype of planned urban development under capitalism was 
furnished by the rebuilding of Paris in the 1850s and 1860s 
under Georges-Eugene Haussmann.165  As a consequence of 
state-sponsored urban reconstruction, Paris emerged as a center 
of commerce and bourgeois life, and its emerging slums were 
removed from the heart of the city to its outer rim.166  While 
Haussmann’s designs “transform[ed] the capital city into the city 
of capital,”167 they also demonstrated that “the root cause of 
urban slumming seems to lie not in urban poverty but in urban 
wealth.”168 
The Haussmann model was replicated in the United States 
after World War II; first in New York under Robert Moses, and 
then in most metropolitan areas.169  While predominantly white 
middle classes, ensconced in debt-financed suburbia, turned to 
the pursuit of individual accumulation, protection of property, 
and so-called family values,  the darker under-classes and the 
marginalized had to contend with removals, blighted inner-city 
ghettos, and inhuman public housing projects.  This phase of 
finance capital’s deployment in urban reordering ended with the 
property-market crash of 1973, and bankruptcy of New York City 
in 1975, with global repercussions.170  The recipe of neoliberalism 
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 164 FRANK M. SNOWDEN, NAPLES IN THE TIME OF CHOLERA, 1884–1911 38–40 (1995). 
 165 For a detailed account, see MICHEL CARMONA, HAUSSMANN: HIS LIFE AND TIMES, 
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN PARIS 149, 151–52, 155–56 (2002). 
 166  See id. at 9, 432–39; DAVID HARVEY, PARIS, CAPITAL OF MODERNITY 95–99 (2003). 
 167 Derek Gregory, Introduction: Troubling Geographies, in DAVID HARVEY: A 
CRITICAL READER, supra note 101, at 13. 
 168 VERMA, supra note 55, at xix. 
 169 See Kenneth T. Jackson, Robert Moses and the Rise of New York: The Power 
Broker in Perspective, in ROBERT MOSES AND THE MODERN CITY: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF NEW YORK 67, 70–71 (Hilary Ballon & Kenneth T. Jackson eds., 2007).  In the process, 
the scale and scope of urbanization was transformed by re-engineering not just existing 
cities but whole metropolitan regions through suburbanization, highway systems, and 
infrastructural transformations.  Finance capital found a new outlet in public and private 
debt, while urban geography and demography reconfigured class and race divides. 
 170 See ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW 
YORK 615–16, 618–19, 795, 899–900, 902–04 (1974); Roger E. Alcaly & Helen Bodian, 
New York’s Fiscal Crisis & the Economy, in THE FISCAL CRISIS OF AMERICAN CITIES 30, 
30–33 (Roger E. Alcaly & David Mermelstein eds., 1977). 
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emerged, in good measure, in response to this crisis of finance 
capital.171 
The reconfigurations of Paris and New York City furnished 
two alternative models of urban development for the modern city 
across the global North: the “donut-shaped” American cities, with 
mostly poor people of color and immigrants “concentrated in 
derelict cores and inner-city,” and “European ‘saucer’ cities, with 
immigrant and unemployed populations marooned in high-rise 
housing on urban outskirts.”172  In the global South, urban 
growth has been a hybrid of both these models, turning urban 
real estate into a high-profit sector “where political corruption, 
capitalist development, and international finance [intersect].”173  
Concentration of real-estate ownership and slum growth are the 
dominant result.174 In this progression, “[t]he word ‘infra-
structure’ is the new code word for the unceremonious clearance 
of the fragile shelters of the poor.”175  As a result, fringes of mega-
cities in the global South are “marked by unrelenting cycles of 
settlement, eviction, and resettlement.”176  Counterintuitive as it 
may be, the poor in most mega-cities of the global South have 
come to dread high-profile international events like conferences, 
festivals, and visits by dignitaries, as the attendant “clean-up” 
and “beautification” drives target slums and slum-dwellers.177  
Hiding poverty behind Potemkin-like facades tends to graduate 
into sustained policy.178  Given these machinations, “[t]o date, 
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 174 For example, in sixteen Southeast Asian cities fifty-three percent of the land is 
owned by the top five percent of landowners. HANS-DIETER EVERS & RÜDIGER KORFF, 
SOUTHEAST ASIAN URBANISM: THE MEANING AND POWER OF SOCIAL SPACE 180 (2000).  In 
India, three-quarters of urban space is owned by “6% of urban households,” and ninety-
one people control the majority of all vacant land in Mumbai. ROBERT-JAN BAKEN & JAN 
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(1992).  For the drain on national savings, see KWADWO KONADU-AGYEMANG, THE 
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EXPERIENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 1998 120–23 (2001); JEFFREY A. NEDOROSCIK, 
CITY OF THE DEAD: A HISTORY OF CAIRO’S CEMETERY COMMUNITIES 42 (1997). 
 175 JEREMY SEABROOK, IN THE CITIES OF THE SOUTH: SCENES FROM A DEVELOPING 
WORLD 267 (1996). 
 176 Ananya Roy, The Gentleman’s City: Urban Informality in the Calcutta of New 
Communism, in URBAN INFORMALITY: TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES FROM THE MIDDLE 
EAST, LATIN AMERICA, AND SOUTH ASIA 147, 159 (Ananya Roy & Nezar AlSayyad eds., 
2004) [hereinafter URBAN INFORMALITY]. 
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(2000). 
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states have been far more effective in the destruction of mass 
housing than in its construction.”179 
Parallel with the neoliberal reordering of global production 
and accumulation, cities are becoming a primary arena of the 
convergence between the domains of economy and culture.180  
Accordingly, a confluence of reconfiguration of urban space and 
commodification of symbolic forms is underway.181  A remarkable 
feature of post-Fordist production systems is the increasing 
significance of production and consumption of cultural 
products.182  In the new economic geography of capital 
accumulation, Fordist mass production is increasingly moved to 
low wage areas, usually away from urban centers, both globally 
and nationally.183  As a result, the city becomes exclusively a zone 
of the service and consumption economy, and urban space itself 
turns into a cultural commodity to be consumed along market 
principles.184  Skills suitable for the service sector and/or the 
capacity to consume what this space has to offer become the only 
grounds for eligibility to be in the city.  Deindustrialization and 
flight of the ineligible often leave in their wake “dead zones” that 
become “developers’ utopias” or “privatopias.”185  The ineligible 
who choose to stay back are eventually confined to the informal 
economy and deprived of secure shelter.  The commodification of 
urban space, with culture and aesthetics at a premium, 
disciplines the ineligible and the dispossessed through a range of 
legal and architectural measures. These include “secure 
architecture,” “zero tolerance policing,” and “preemptive crime 
control,” in the neoliberal “post-justice” city.186 
 
 179 Berner, Learning from Informal Markets, supra note 38, at 295. 
 180 For transformative impacts of neoliberal globalization on urban spaces around the 
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128 (2000). 
 181 For a thoughtful survey, see generally Allen J. Scott, Capitalism, Cities, and the 
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 182 Id. at 16. 
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http://www.jstor.org/stable/3644185. 
 184 See generally Timothy A. Gibson, Selling City Living: Urban Branding 
Campaigns, Class Power and the Civic Good, 8 INT’L J. CULTURAL STUD. 259 (2005). 
 185 Gordon MacLeod et al., Negotiating the Contemporary City: Introduction, 40 URB. 
STUD. 1655, 1656 (2003) (citation omitted).  See also Henry W. McGee, Jr., Seattle's 
Central District, 1990–2006: Integration of Displacement?, 39 URB. LAW. 167, 169–71 
(2007). 
 186 See Don Mitchell, Postmodern Geographical Praxis? The Postmodern Impulse and 
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THEORY AND PRAXIS 57, 77, 82 (Claudio Minca ed., 2001); Don Mitchell, The Annihilation 
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In the midst of all of this, urban groups do manage to 
contrive cultural, economic, and political “spaces of escape,” or 
“counter spaces.”187  Farmers markets, alternative lifestyle 
enclaves, and the “underground economy” are some examples of 
this phenomenon that engender “new identities and practices 
that disturb established histories.”188  The resistive mode of these 
counter spaces can and does take overt political forms as 
demonstrated by the anti-WTO protests in Seattle in 1999, and 
replicated in many major cities around the world.189  This 
phenomenon is of particular significance for policy and 
engagement options related to slums and slum dwellers. 
Having laid out a theoretical framework of the historical 
evolution of urban slums, we turn to the issue of slums and slum-
dwellers in India. 
III.  SLUMS, COLONIALISM, AND POSTCOLONIALITY 
A. The Colonial Legacy 
The roots of urban slums in the global South go back to 
colonial policies aimed at reconfiguring existing cities, or 
establishing new ones, in forms suitable for assertion of control 
and incorporation of selected sections of the native society into 
administrative and productive ensembles sutured with the 
economies of empire.190  In India, British colonial designs 
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reconfigured selected urban areas to serve these ends.191  A 
defining feature of the designed colonial cities was the spatial 
divide between the centers of gravity of colonial presence and the 
native quarters.  Zoning and institutionalized governance whose 
jurisdiction is coextensive with the territory of the city, the 
hallmarks of a modern city, were but rarely extended to the 
native quarters.192  Natives not recruited into colonial security, 
administrative, and commercial regimes, remained at or beyond 
the spatial and social margins of reconfigured urban areas.193  
Colonizers’ fears of racial contamination, dilution of imagined 
tribal and ethnic divides, and the threat of anti-colonial 
solidarities resulted in restrictions on urban land ownership, 
pass laws, vagrancy ordinances, criminalization of urban 
migration, and racially zoned areas.194  When vigorously enforced 
encroachment laws targeted squatting and street vending, 
municipal authorities removed so-called “plague spots” from 
better residential and commercial areas, thereby enforcing 
restrictive zoning around areas where the colonizers and 
gradually enfranchised native elites lived.195  A policy of neglect 
toward even minimal water and sanitation needs of native 
neighborhoods graduated into a de facto housing policy of 
reliance on local elites who built overcrowded and unsanitary, 
but highly profitable, tenements that still house a bulk of urban 
dwellers.196  For the story of Dharavi, it is important to note that 
Mumbai, historically a coastal fishing village, emerged as an 
urban center under colonial rule; a development rooted in the 
colonial control of opium production and trade.197  The new city 
was carefully segregated to separate colonial masters, the native 
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rich and emerging middle classes, and the dispossessed 
natives.198 
B. Postcolonial Developmental State 
After decolonization in the global South, postcolonial elites 
inherited and often reinforced the physical footprints and 
exclusionary geographies of segregated colonial cities.199  They 
became the custodians of the colonial designs of urban exclusion 
and social divides, and rushed to embrace trickle-down 
development models that were ubiquitous in the 1950s and 
1960s, whereby “the poor were denied a place in civic life and 
urban culture, and were seen as an impediment to progress and 
betterment of society.”200  Postcolonial growth of slums in India 
was first triggered by the greatest mass migration in recorded 
history following the partition of colonial India, which drove 
millions into urban slums of India.201  The slum-based refugees 
quickly became dependent on corrupt political party machines, 
and slum growth became notoriously synchronized with election 
cycles.202  Subsequently, the fate of the slums reflected different 
development models put in place and cycles of growth and 
stagnation. 
In India, as elsewhere, economic development entails 
reallocation of resources and is thus a “conflictual process.”203  
The critical role of the state in allocating and channeling 
resources sets the parameters of political economy.204  In India, 
the national capitalists, the rich farmers, and the bureaucracy, 
instituted a “one-party democracy” under the umbrella of the 
Congress Party,205 and claimed the moral high ground of national 
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interest, modernity, equity, justice, and efficiency.206  Central 
planning and an industrial policy designed by a statistician, 
Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis, aimed at rapid industrialization 
through import-substitution, and state control of heavy industry, 
banking, and infrastructure. 207  The prime object was “to contain 
class conflict within manageable dimensions, [and] to control and 
manipulate the many dispersed power relations in society to 
further as best as possible the thrust towards accumulation.”208  
The Nehruvite consensus sutured development with welfare.  
Poverty-alleviation was projected as the central concern of the 
state; indeed, its raison d’etre.209  A permanent bureaucracy, the 
inherited “steel frame” of colonial rule, was deployed to lead this 
project.210 
This was the phase when the development model of 
modernization by diffusion enjoyed hegemony.211  Even though 
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tempered by nationalism and a commitment to a “mixed-
economy,” the result was a bloated state apparatus presiding 
over top-down economic growth in concert with international aid 
agencies.212  The pervasive nationalist promises of the 1950s and 
1960s to rebuild slums and create new housing faltered quickly, 
parallel with the early demise of plans to create an autonomous 
economy resistant to global economic pressures.213  While mega-
projects like hydroelectric dams, atomic energy, and heavy 
industry thrived, education, health, and housing needs of the 
poor and the marginalized got short shrift.214  Often this de-
velopment model led directly to the swelling of the ranks of the 
urban poor.  For example, over fifty-six million, mostly “the 
poorest of the poor,” have been displaced in India by large hydro-
electric dams.215  By the late 1970s, any lingering faith in the 
development through state-led growth was shattered by poor 
growth rates, only marginal decline in poverty, and barely 
appreciable improvements in the quality of life.216  As the nation-
alist development project derailed and took down with it the 
Nehruvite consensus, populist adjustments were attempted.  
Gharibi hatao (eliminate poverty), the slogan fashioned by Indira 
Gandhi in 1975 as a rationale for declaring Emergency, was an 
acknowledgement that benefits of development and growth had 
not “trickled down” and that poverty needed to be tackled 
through specific, dedicated programs.217  Indira Gandhi’s Emer-
gency symbolized “the definitive demise of the Nehruvian 
project . . . [and] the terminal crisis of the Nehruvian state.”218  
 
(1995).  This model of development was an extension of colonial designs of social 
development. See VINAY GIDWANI, CAPITAL, INTERRUPTED: AGRARIAN DEVELOPMENT AND 
THE POLITICS OF WORK IN INDIA 84 (2008).  It was in this context that the “law and 
development” project emerged as part of the ensemble of prescribed legal designs far 
removed from the culture, practices and material needs of the vast populations of the 
global South. See JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND 
FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 7–9 (1980); Laura Nader, Promise or Plunder? A Past and 
Future Look at Law and Development, 7 GLOBAL JURIST 1, 1–3 (2007).  See generally Issa 
G. Shivji, Law’s Empire and Empire’s Lawlessness: Beyond Anglo-American Law, 1 SOC. 
JUST. & GLOBAL DEV. J. (2003). 
 212 GIDWANI, supra note 211, at 84. 
 213 See GEORGE ROSEN, WESTERN ECONOMISTS AND EASTERN SOCIETIES: AGENTS OF 
CHANGE IN SOUTH ASIA 1950–1970 15, 227 (1985). 
 214 See ROBERT-JAN BAKEN, PLOTTING, SQUATTING, PUBLIC PURPOSE AND POLITICS: 
LAND MARKET DEVELOPMENT, LOW INCOME HOUSING AND PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN INDIA 
56–59, 305–10 (2003). 
 215 AMITAVA KUMAR, BOMBAY, LONDON, NEW YORK 52 (2002). 
 216 See Surendra J. Patel, Goals of Planning in the Seventies: A Note, 6 ECON. & POL. 
WKLY. 1565, 1567–68 (1971). 
 217 See James P. Grant, Development: The End of Trickle Down?, 12 FOREIGN POL’Y 
43, 43–44 (1973), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148094; Vijay Prashad, 
Emergency Assessments, 24 SOC. SCIENTIST 36, 38, 53 (1996). 
 218 Ajaz Ahmad, Debating the Current Conjuncture, in CONTESTED 
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 35, at 34, 43–45. 
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However, declining growth rates, escalating fiscal crisis of the 
state, and fragmentation of the legitimacy of political elites ruled 
out the implementation of refurbished welfare policies. 
As the development project faltered in India, as elsewhere in 
the global South, the World Bank started to question the 
accumulation- and growth-centric approaches to development 
and turned toward alleviation of poverty as a goal distinct from 
growth.219  Funding patterns were recalibrated to target agri-
culture, education, infrastructure, and low-cost housing.220  In 
the new approach, the developmental state was to address 
poverty by direct intervention.221  Kalyan Sanyal argues that as a 
result there emerged “governmentalization” of the state in 
India—management of the social body through direct inter-
vention of the state in terms of rationally-designed efficient 
technologies of administration aimed at promoting the welfare of 
society.222  This was combined with the rise of “entitlements”—a 
relation connecting one set of ownership to another through 
certain rules of legitimacy.223  In the sixth Five Year Plan of 
1980, “a number of poverty eradication measures were intro-
duced.”224  They proved easier to design than to implement.  
Sanyal claims that the blows of primitive accumulation were 
softened during this period by the emergence of “welfarist 
governmentality.”225  He acknowledges, however, the exponential 
growth of the informal sector and the fact that formal and 
informal economies “are locked in an asymmetric relation . . . of 
dominance and subordination,” which leaves the “need economy” 
 
 219  See ROBERT L. AYRES, BANKING ON THE POOR: THE WORLD BANK AND WORLD 
POVERTY 1 (1983). 
 220 See id.  The new approach 
posed some serious challenges to the prevalent Bank ideology.  The result was 
a somewhat ambiguous pastiche of concepts and approaches. . . .  The 
result . . . was a rather tenuous gluing together of some markedly divergent 
approaches.  Poverty-oriented emphasis sometimes seemed to have been 
pasted on the prevalent ideology, without, however, altering its fundamental 
slant. 
Id. at 75. 
 221 SANYAL, supra note 77, at 170. 
 222 Id. at 170–73.  Sanyal’s claim is that “in a simultaneous process, the dispossessed 
are rehabilitated through the ‘pastoral functions’ of international organizations and the 
development state, [and that] governmentality is actively engaged in forming a need-
economy be reversing the process of dispossession.” Id. at 220. 
 223 Id. at 178.  Sanyal deploys Amartya Sen’s notions of entitlement that “refer to a 
set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the 
totality of rights and opportunities.” AMARTYA SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES AND 
DEVELOPMENT 497 (1984). 
 224 SUKHAMOY CHAKRAVARTY, DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 36 
(1987). 
 225 SANYAL, supra note 77, at 221. 
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subordinate to the “accumulation-economy.”226  In his rush to 
apply the Foucauldian construct to conditions of post-
coloniality,227 Sanyal elides the fact that at this stage the “one-
party democracy” had disintegrated, and that the collapse of the 
developmentalist state combined with a backlash against 
proposed aggressive affirmative action had produced a revolt by 
the middle classes and religious fundamentalism in India.228  The 
reordering of political power and deepening fiscal crisis of the 
state precluded any sustained attack on poverty.  None of this 
was good news for the swelling ranks of the urban poor and their 
housing needs. 
In India, as the postcolonial state entrenched itself, state 
largess focused on housing members of bureaucracies, the 
military, and the emerging professional class, while lip-service 
was paid to the needs of the marginalized.229  In the 1970s, for 
example, public authorities promised the urban poor new homes 
and jobs in a modern twin-city opposite the Mumbai peninsula.230  
However, while local residents of the new site were displaced, the 
bulk of new housing went to civil servants and professionals.231  
A perceptive commentary noted: 
Ultimately, the grand conception of urban transformation was 
whittled down and domesticated to meet the immediate interests of 
the propertied classes.  Instead of unfolding as idealistic projects of 
social regeneration, the town planning schemes evolved as avenues to 
further the interests and aspirations of the propertied and the 
instrument of the growing marginalization of the poor.  The war 
against slums came dangerously close to being a battle to control the 
settlement and habitation of the poor, and indeed an offensive against 
the poor themselves.232 
 
 226 Id. at 220–21. 
 227 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN 
GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 87–104 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991). 
 228 MANDAL COMMISSION, RESERVATION FOR BACKWARD CLASSES: MANDAL 
COMMISSION REPORT OF THE BACKWARD CLASSES COMMISSION 255 (1980) (recommending 
that the quota for “Scheduled Castes and Tribes” and “Other Backward Classes” in public 
employment and universities be increased from 27% to 49.5%).  Steps toward 
implementation of these recommendations triggered a backlash. See NEVEDITA MENON & 
ADITYA NIGAM, POWER AND CONTESTATION: INDIA SINCE 1989 15–16 (2007); Jeemol Unni, 
Contours of Conflict and Coalition: Rise of the Intermediate Classes and Castes, in 
CONTESTED TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 35, at 257; Pradip Kumar Datta, Hindutva 
and the Re-Formation of the Indian Middle-Class Subject, in CONTESTED 
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 35, at 270–71. 
 229 DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 66. 
 230 Id. at 65–66. 
 231 Id.; JACQUEMIN, supra note 29, at 196–97 (indicating that the development of the 
New Bombay area led to the loss of land, jobs, and incomes to the majority of local 
residents, which explained why the new housing went to civil servants and professionals). 
 232 GOOPTU, supra note 195, at 84. 
Do Not Delete 12/12/2010 7:34 PM 
36 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 14:1 
C. The Neoliberal Reordering 
In this general context, India took a turn to neoliberal 
restructuring in the early 1990s, ushering in an era of 
“liberalisation-privatisation-globalisation,”233 marking “a funda-
mental transformation of India’s economic strategy.”234  It was 
envisaged that the economy “would be transformed in its basic 
orientation in a matter of a few years.”235  This entailed rapidly 
instituted deregulation, privatization, curtailment of food sub-
sidies, cost recovery of public services, and liberalization of 
trade.236  Indian markets were opened up to an influx of capital, 
goods, and services.  Foreign capital investment soared, as did 
the stock market and the real estate market.  High, though 
doubtful, growth rates, based largely on performance of the 
service sector were sustained.237  A thorough empirical study 
finds that these rates of growth are not associated with 
liberalization of the domestic economy and international trade, 
but are a case of sustained growth that began a decade earlier.238  
This presents “an important counterexample to the dominant 
orthodoxy.”239  In addition, accelerated remittances by skilled and 
unskilled labor buoyed foreign exchange reserves. 
With the neoliberal turn in public policies, corporate capital 
assumed political and moral sway over the social formation.  This 
hegemony was deployed to influence governmental decisions “not 
through electoral mobilisation of political parties and movements 
but largely through the bureaucratic-managerial class, the 
increasingly influential print and visual media, and the judiciary 
and other independent regulatory bodies.”240  The bureaucratic-
managerial class now stands subordinated to corporate capital.241  
The latter is now in a position to set the terms of the political 
field to which other social groups are constrained to respond.  
 
 233 Mary E. John & Satish Deshpande, Theorising the Present: Problems and 
Possibilities, 43 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 83, 84 (2008).  See also Kamal Nayan Kabra, Indian 
Planning and Liberalisation, 31 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2740, 2740–41 (1996); Kuldeep 
Mathur, Neo-liberal Agenda and Study of Institutions, 1 REV. OF DEV. & CHANGE 167, 175 
(1996). 
 234 Ashutosh Varshney, Mass Politics or Elite Politics? India’s Economic Reforms in 
Comparative Perspective, in INDIA IN THE ERA OF ECONOMIC REFORMS 222, 230 (Jeffrey D. 
Sachs et al. eds., 1999). 
 235 Jeffrey Sachs et al., Introduction, in INDIA IN THE ERA OF ECONOMIC REFORMS, 
supra note 234, at 1, 13. 
 236 Id. at 13–16. 
 237 Prabhat Patnaik, The Meaning of Contemporary Globalization, in CONTESTED 
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 35, at 7. 
 238 MCCARTNEY, supra note 203, at 236. 
 239 Id. at 235. 
 240 Partha Chatterjee, Democracy and Economic Transformation in India, 43 ECON. & 
POL. WKLY. 53, 57 (2008). 
 241 Id. at 57–58. 
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The well-heeled took the position that “our second independence 
had arrived: we were going to be free from a rapacious and 
domineering state.”242  The market emerged as the new messiah, 
and the welfare and development state went into a decisive 
retreat.  Macroeconomic policy became obsessed with the specter 
of fiscal deficits.243  The question of poverty and the poor went 
through a fundamental reframing.  Any expressions of the state’s 
concern for the poor under the “current versions are clearly 
framed in minimalist and palliative terms . . . politically dictated 
afterthoughts forced on to the agenda by electoral 
compulsions.”244 
During the same time, the number of paupers in the country 
increased by fifty-six million, and between 1991 and 1994 the 
deregulated price for food grain grew by fifty-eight percent.245  
Real wages of the poorest quintile in Delhi fell for the first time 
since 1947.246  The assigned reasons are the increased cost and 
increased use of privatized services, reduced access to subsidized 
food supplies, and a simultaneous shift away from formal sector 
waged work to self-employment and casual labor in the informal 
sector.247  The impact on slum-dwellers has been particularly 
acute.248  In Bangalore, the storied capital of the neoliberal high-
tech boom, slums grew twice as fast as the general population 
with an estimated two million poor squatting in one thousand 
filthy slums, and the city’s periphery became “the dumping 
ground for those urban residents whose labour is wanted in the 
urban economy, but whose visual presence should be reduced as 
much as possible.”249 Urban dwellers are not the only 
“beneficiaries” of the neo-liberal “Shining India.”  Between 1997 
and 2007, as WTO-mandated agricultural policies took root, 
182,936 Indian farmers committed suicide; growing debt burden 
 
 242 GURCHARAN DAS, INDIA UNBOUND: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE GLOBAL 
INFORMATION AGE xi (2002). 
 243 The high watermark of this obsession was the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget 
Management Act of 2003, which binds the government to reduce the revenue deficit to 
zero by 2009–2010. Mihir Shah, Structures of Power in Indian Society: A Response, 43 
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 78, 80 (2008). 
 244 John & Deshpande, supra note 233. 
 245 DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 171; SEABROOK, supra note 175, at 46. 
 246 Gautam Bhan, “This Is No Longer the City I Once Knew”: Evictions, the Urban 
Poor and the Right to the City in Millennial Delhi, 21 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 127, 136 
(2009). 
 247 Id. 
 248 See generally KALYANI MENON-SEN & GAUTAM BHAN, SWEPT OFF THE MAP: 
SURVIVING EVICTION AND RESETTLEMENT IN DELHI (2008); A. Iyer and Gita Sen, Health 
Sector Changes and Health Equity in the 1990s in India, in HEALTH AND EQUITY: 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES (2000).  See also Minar Pimple & Madhuri Kamat, Struggle 
for People’s Housing, 59 INDIAN J. SOCIAL WORK 357, 358–59 (1999). 
 249 Schenk-Sandberg, supra note 46, at 131. 
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and the switch to cash-crops are cited as the primary reasons.250  
In 2007, the Planning Commission candidly admitted that WTO 
“compulsions” had induced removal of tariffs and subsidies for 
the agriculture sector resulting in a “major crisis” in the 1990s.251  
Indeed, Bertolt Brecht had observed accurately that “famines do 
not simply occur; they are organised by the grain trade.”252 
How does neoliberalism gain legitimacy in the face of its 
track record? This is accomplished through “infiltration of 
market logic into politics,”253 and the deployment of “an economic 
logic in defining, evaluating, and protecting certain categories of 
subjects and not others.”254  In this transition, the neoliberal 
project is framed as “government of free individuals who are then 
induced to self-manage according to market principles of 
discipline, efficiency, and competitiveness.”255  Neoliberalism is 
about “self-responsibilization.”256  Responsibilities and capacities 
of the states, save perhaps for war and internal security, are 
shrunk.  Historic popular expectations from the state are folded.  
Self-contained individuals, now “freed” from the state, are to take 
responsibility to provide for themselves, optimize their 
participation in the “free” market, and not look to the state for 
any assistance or protection.257  For the wealthy, this may lead to 
more wealth and consumption, but for the poor this just adds 
another burden, the burden of responsibility, without any change 
in their capacity to shoulder it.  Inequality is naturalized, and 
the differentiated opportunities of life that come with it are 
deemed an inevitable part of the “free” market. 
How do the Indian ruling elites square the heralded 
economic miracle with increased vulnerability of the vulnerable?  
How does neoliberalism displace historical commitments and 
expectations of a caring and patrimonial state, particularly when 
 
 250 P. Sainath, Neo-Liberal Terrorism in India: The Largest Wave of Suicides in 
History, COUNTERPUNCH (Feb. 12, 2009), http://www.counterpunch.org/ 
sainath02122009.html. 
 251 In the 1990s, the rate of growth fell below the rate of population growth for the 
first time since the 1960s. Shah, supra note 243, at 80.  The rate of growth of dryland 
crops that were grown and consumed by the poorest sections of the population dropped 
below zero. Id. 
 252 Susan Marks, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFT, supra note 135, 
at 1, 13.  See also AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND 
DEPRIVATION 78–81 (1983); MIKE DAVIS, LATE VICTORIAN HOLOCAUSTS: EL NIÑO FAMINES 
AND THE MAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD 26–27(2001). 
 253 AIHWA ONG, NEOLIBERALISM AS EXCEPTION: MUTATIONS IN CITIZENSHIP AND 
SOVEREIGNTY 6 (2006). 
 254 Id. at 16. 
 255 Id. at 4. 
 256 See NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 45 
(1999). 
 257 Id. at 142. 
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these stand enshrined in the Constitution?  This is accomplished 
by reconfiguring the social contract between the state and the 
subject, by reconstituting the grounds of eligibility for full 
citizenship, by redrawing expectations of collective responsibility, 
and by changing the composition of the political power-bloc.  In 
India, as in many other places, over the last two decades 
corporate capital has secured dominance of the ruling power-
bloc.258  Representing the interests of elites and professionals of 
the formal economy, the reconfigured power-bloc now holds 
moral-political hegemony—“the capitalist class . . . has . . . acquired 
a position to set the terms to which other political formations can 
only respond.”259  To achieve such domination and hegemony in 
India, a polity that is a representative democracy and has a 
historical political alliance between the poor and the nationalist 
elite, required recalibration of the democratic process. 
This recalibration entailed turning electoral representative 
democracy into a “free market democracy.”  For example, 
between two and  ten billion dollars were spent in the 2009 
general election in India, ninety percent of independent 
candidates lost, and the ruling coalition won a resounding 
mandate to continue on the path of neoliberalism by securing 
thirty-seven percent of the votes cast which work out to 10.3% of 
the country’s population.260  Elections in India have been turned 
into “heavily-sponsored, TV-friendly spectator sports . . . 
[whereby] an electorate has been turned into a market, voters are 
seen as consumers, and democracy is being welded to the free 
market.  Ergo: those who cannot consume do not matter.”261  In 
line with exhortations of neoliberalism, governance was 
increasingly turned into a matter of administration rather than 
politics, with a government that is run by technocrats rather 
than political representatives.  At play here is the production of a 
distinction between the concept of citizens and that of 
populations.  While the concept of citizen carried the notion of 
participating in sovereignty of the state, now the population is 
supposed to be a passive target of policies designed and 
implemented by government functionaries.  As part of this 
process, an ideological reconstruction of poverty and inequality 
 
 258 See PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED: REFLECTIONS ON 
POPULAR POLITICS IN MOST OF THE WORLD 136–44 (2004). 
 259 Partha Chatterjee, Democracy and Economic Transformation in India, supra note 
240, at 61. 
 260 ARUNDHATI ROY, FIELD NOTES ON DEMOCRACY: LISTENING TO GRASSHOPPERS 14–
15 (2009). 
 261  Id. at 17.  For a case study of political marketing in the 1989 parliamentary 
election in India, see DILIP M. SARWATE, POLITICAL MARKETING: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 
110–201 (1990). 
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unfolded that furnishes the ethical grounds for the disavowal of 
the rights of the poor.  The Indian judiciary played a critical role 
in this enterprise. 
IV.  “CITIZENS” TO “ENCROACHERS”:  PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE 
INDIAN JUDICIARY 
A. Slums, Citizens, and Human Rights 
The record of the Indian judiciary regarding slums and 
housing needs of the urban poor is a checkered one.  It 
demonstrates that the law is a historical force that has both 
emancipatory and oppressive potential.262  Judges play their role 
in cultivating the hegemony of the dominant social forces by 
“creating a social conformism which is useful to the ruling 
group’s line of development.”263  Judges help the law become an 
effective social force by cementing society and economy together 
and binding subordinate groups to the will of the dominant.  
They emerge as “organic intellectuals” by constructing social 
domination as an articulation of the public interest or common 
sense.264 
During the nationalist development phase, slum-dwellers, 
squatters, and other marginalized groups had some expectation 
of state protection.  These expectations were grounded in an 
amalgamation of claims based on needs, rights of citizenship, and 
a recognition of the value of their participation in the economy–
expectations endorsed by stated public policy and pro-
nouncements of the courts.265  For a brief period, the courts 
tempered the violence of evictions and demolitions, ever-present 
dangers for slum-dwellers, by requiring adequate resettlement 
 
 262 This is best captured by Gramsci who postulates the immanent unity of material 
and ideational conditions.  Law is seen here as operating dialectically, both coercively as 
the arm of the state and consensually within civil society, “turning necessity and coercion 
into ‘freedom.’” ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF 
ANTONIO GRAMSCI 242 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith trans. & eds., 1971).  For 
a detailed treatment of Gramsci’s conception of the “double face of the law,” see Maureen 
Cain, Gramsci, the State and the Place of Law, in LEGALITY, IDEOLOGY AND THE STATE 95, 
98 (David Sugerman ed., 1983).  For the tension between “determinate” and “responsive” 
impulses of modern law, see PETER FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW 
70–71 (2001). 
 263 A. Claire Cutler, Gramsci, Law, and the Culture of Global Capitalism, 8 CRITICAL 
REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 527, 527 (2005). 
 264 See CHANTAL MOUFFE, Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, in GRAMSCI AND 
MARXIST THEORY 168, 187 (1979). 
 265 Holston terms the grounds of such expectations of the state a “hybrid of special 
treatment rights, contributor rights, and text based rights.” JAMES HOLSTON, INSURGENT 
CITIZENSHIP 253 (2008).  For a detailed analysis of such expectations and their 
recognition, see MENON & NIGAM, supra note 228, at 74; PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE 
POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED: REFLECTIONS ON POPULAR POLITICS IN MOST OF THE WORLD 
135–37 (2004). 
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schemes.266  The neoliberal turn triggered a rupture, leading to a 
redefinition of poverty and the rights of the poor.  Over the last 
two decades Indian courts have cast aside any considerations of 
humane treatment and adequate resettlement of squatters and 
have adopted a discourse of the illegality of slums and 
squatting.267  The link between public interest, urban 
development, and housing for the poor has been reconstituted by 
the erasure of any public responsibility for housing the urban 
poor. 
In the landmark Pavement Dwellers Case (1985), the 
Supreme Court of India located the right to shelter within the 
ensemble of fundamental rights while allowing the state to clear 
streets and other urban spaces in the interest of order.268  It held 
that “no person has a right to encroach, by erecting a structure or 
otherwise, on footpaths, pavements or any other place reserved 
or ear-marked for a public purpose.”269  However, it also re-
cognized that the loss of “the pavement or the slum is to lose the 
job,” and because the right to livelihood is an important facet of 
the right to life, “the eviction of the [pavement dwellers] will lead 
to deprivation of their livelihood and consequently to the 
deprivation of life.”270  Significantly, the Court argued that the 
urban poor do not “claim the right to dwell on pavements or in 
slums for the purpose of pursuing any activity which is illegal, 
immoral or contrary to public interest. Many of them pursue 
occupations which are humble but honorable.”271  The Court also 
noted that it was the failure of the state to implement master 
plans for cities that had caused the problem in the first place.272  
The Court approved removals on the grounds that there was no 
absolute prohibition on the deprivation of life or liberty as long as 
the procedure established by law was followed.273  However, it 
articulated empathy for slum and pavement dwellers, and a 
desire to minimize the harm in the process of relocation.274  It 
instructed the government to provide alternative settlement sites 
for slums that had existed for twenty years or more, and 
 
 266 MENON & NIGAM, supra note 228, at 74–80. 
 267 Id. at 75–80. 
 268 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun., (1985) 1 S.C.C. 545 (India).  This case along with 
most of the other cases discussed in this section involving eviction, demolition, and 
resettlement, concerned Delhi, the capital of India.  For detailed empirical data on the 
subject, see generally MENON-SEN & BHAN, supra note 248. 
 269 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun., (1985) 1 S.C.C. 545 (India). 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. 
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reminded the government of the plans for slum upgrading and 
low-income housing.275 
In another decision, announced on the same day as the 
Pavement Dweller’s Case, the Supreme Court mandated that 
alternative housing must be provided before evictions can take 
place, accepted a governmental assurance that “steps are being 
taken for the purpose of improving the slums and wherever they 
cannot be improved, alternative accommodation is provided to 
the slum-dwellers” and expressed confidence that “the govern-
ment will continue to evince the same dynamic interest in the 
welfare of the pavement dwellers and slum-dwellers.”276  In 1990, 
the Supreme Court went a step further to state that “reasonable 
residence is an indispensible necessity” for human development 
and the fulfillment of the “right to life.”277  In 1996, the Court 
argued that the “right to life guaranteed in any civilized society 
implies the right to food, water, decent environment, education, 
medical care and shelter,” and held that Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution held within its ambit the right to shelter in order to 
make the right to life more meaningful.278  The Court read the 
constitution in the light of all civil, political, social, and cultural 
rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
to hold that “[s]helter for a human being . . .  is not a mere 
protection of his life and limb. It is a home where he has 
opportunities to grow physically, mentally, intellectually and 
spiritually.”279  In 1997, the Court defined human rights to 
include everyone’s “right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and wellbeing of himself and his family; it includes food, 
clothing, housing, medical care and necessary social services.”280  
It held that the right to life is not confined to physical existence 
but includes the right to live with human dignity.281  Other 
decisions continued to push the frontiers of fundamental rights to 
include, for example, the right to education,282 the right to heath 
and medical care,283 and 
 
 275 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun., (1985) 1 S.C.C. 545 (India). 
 276 K. Chandru v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1985) 3 S.C.C. 536 (India), available at 
http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/citation1.aspx. 
 277 Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Gotame, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 630, 634 
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 278 Chameli Singh v. State of Utter Pradesh, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1051, 1053 (India). 
 279 Id. 
 280 Ahmedabad Municipal Corp. v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 152, 
158 (India). 
 281 Id.  See generally Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R 1981 S.C. 746 (India). 
 282 Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1858, 1864–92 (India).  See 
also J. P. Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178 (India), 
available at http://www. Indiankanoon.org/doc/1775396/. 
 283 Consumer Educ. & Research Ctr. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 940 (India). 
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[t]he right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, 
namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, 
clothing, shelter over the head and facilities for reading, writing and 
expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing 
and commingling with fellow human beings.284 
Slum-dwellers and the marginalized had secured these 
protections during the boom years of public interest litigation 
(PIL) in India.285  This device initially emerged as a vehicle to 
protect legal rights of a “person or determinate class of persons 
[who] by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or social or 
economic disadvantaged position [are] unable to reach the court 
for relief.”286 Dubbed “judicial activism,” and even “judicial 
excessivism,” PIL entailed dilution of the rules of standing, 
expansion of epistolary jurisdiction, and relaxation of adversarial 
procedural devices to provide access to those who by virtue of 
their “socially or economically disadvantaged position are unable 
to approach the court[s] for relief.”287  PIL opened the door for 
anyone to approach the highest courts in matters of public 
interest to “espouse the cause of the poor and oppressed 
(representative standing) and those wishing to enforce per-
formance of public duties (citizen standing).”288  The Supreme 
Court of India saw itself as the “last resort for the oppressed and 
bewildered,”289 assuming the mantle of a “Supreme Court for 
 
 284 Francis Coralie Mullin v. Adm’r, Union of Territory of Delhi, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 746, 
753 (India). 
 285 See generally Jamie Cassel, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in 
India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495, 497 (1989); HANS DEMBOWSKI, 
TAKING THE STATE TO COURT: PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN 
METROPOLITAN INDIA 58 (2001); SAMPAT JAIN, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 12 (2002); 
Jill Cottrell, Courts and Accountability: Public Interest Litigation in the Indian High 
Courts, 1992 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 199, 199–200 (1992). 
 286 S.P. Gupta v. President of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149 (India), available at 
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1294854.  It should be noted that the PIL phase was ushered 
in only after the Indian judiciary yielded on its previously inflexible protection of private 
property rights and the blocking of important socio-economic legislations including 
amendments to the Constitution.  It was only in 1973 that the Indian Supreme Court 
recognized that a constitution “is an organic document which must grow and must take 
stock of the vast socioeconomic problems.” Bharati v. Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 
(India), available at http://indiankaoon.org/dc/1294854. 
 287 S.P. Gupta v. President of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149 (India), available at 
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1294854. In this case, Justice Bhagwati elaborated the 
frameworks for “representative standing,” and “citizen standing.” Id.  For further details, 
see S. P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA: TRANGRESSING BORDERS AND ENFORCING 
LIMITS 215 (2003); S. P. Sathe, The Unfinished Agenda: The Constitution at the 
Crossroads, 42 J. INDIAN L. INST. 171, 186 (2000). 
 288 Lavanya Rajamani, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India: Exploring 
Issues of Access, Participation, Equity, Effectiveness and Sustainability, 19 J. ENVT’L. 
L. 93, 293 n.4 (2007). 
 289 Id. 
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India.”290  PIL emerged precisely at the moment of the collapse of 
the nationalist development project. 
Progressive PIL decisions by the courts brought major 
changes in, among other things, the state of urban life.  These 
actions included removal and relocation of large urban industries 
to outside city limits,291 the conversion of all public transport and 
private commercial transport to the use of compressed natural 
gas,292 ridding the River Ganges of effluents,293 and removal of 
garbage from the cities.294  The courts’ involvement extended into 
oversight of implementation of their directives.295  Encouraged by 
judicial pronouncements, in 1990, the Indian Law Commission 
recommended a new law to give statutory basis to a right of 
slum-dwellers to resettlement, preceding destruction of their 
homes.296  No such law was ever enacted.  Similarly, an attempt 
to amend the Constitution to make the right to housing a 
fundamental right failed.  Neoliberalism had arrived to change 
not only the rules of the game, but the game itself. 
B. Encroachers in the Showcase City 
PIL may well have stayed on its path, had not the global 
rules of the game changed so markedly with the neoliberal turn.  
In its new iteration, PIL was used by the courts to assume the 
role of policy maker and policy enforcer with the backing of the 
urban professional-managerial classes, who, under the spell of 
ideologies of corporate capital, have turned away from the state 
as the primary orchestrator of change.  The judiciary, the non-
political branch of government, became an instrumentality to de-
politicize political questions of distribution, equity, access, and 
opportunity. 
As neoliberal deregulation of the economy, down-sizing of the 
public sector, and “free market” ideologies became entrenched, 
the courts took a dramatic turn.  Judicial activism in the interest 
 
 290 Upendra Baxi, The Avatars of Indian Judicial Activism: Explorations in the 
Geography of [In]justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA: ITS GRASP AND 
REACH 156, 157 (S. K. Verma, Kusum & A.S. Anand eds., 2000) (emphasis added). 
 291 M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, Petition No. 13381 (Taj Trapenzium Case 1984). 
 292 M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, Petition No. 13029 (Dehli Vehicular Pollution Case 
1985). 
 293 M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 3727 (Ganges Pollution Case 
1985). 
 294 Almitra Patel v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 888 (Garbage Removal Case 
1996). 
 295 See Rajamani, supra note 288, at 315.  In this regard, the courts were not only the 
arbiters of law and justice, but also functioned as parallel administrative and executive 
bodies in matters of urban affairs. 
 296 LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHTH REPORT ON 
LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION FOR SLUM AND PAVEMENT DWELLERS 26 (1990). 
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of the marginalized, seen as “chemotherapy for the carcinogenic 
body politic,”297 quickly turned lethal. With the neoliberal turn, 
the pace of evictions and demolitions of extra-legal settlements 
accelerated dramatically.298  Significantly, these eviction and 
demolitions were not mandated by any public planning directive 
or state action.  Rather, they were ordered by the courts in 
response to PIL actions initiated by trade and non-poor resident 
welfare associations.  In a dramatic switch, PIL, a weapon 
designed for the marginalized, was now wielded by the 
privileged.299  The privileged could use PIL because questions at 
hand, on their surface, involved use of public lands and did not 
implicate the protection of privately held property or the 
violation of any individual right.300  Evictions and demolitions 
were sought in public interest in urban solid waste management 
and the enforcement of urban master plans.301  Indian courts now 
turned PIL into a tool to monitor and direct the exercise of state 
power in tune with the neoliberal schema; the “free market” was 
to address the substantive interests of the poor and the 
marginalized.302  By a reconstruction of “public interest,” a pro-
cess of “dispossession by law”303 at the service of accumulation by 
dispossession304 was set in motion.  An analyst summarized the 
trend: 
There was a time when courts would provide relief from the harsh and 
arbitrary actions of the executive reflected, in say the grant [of] stay of 
demolition of slums on the grounds of the lack of a rehabilitation plan 
 
 297 Upendra Baxi, Preface, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA ix, xvi (S. P. Sathe ed., 2d 
ed. 2002). 
 298 For example, in Delhi, while between 1990–2003, 51,461 dwellings were 
demolished under “slum clearance schemes,” between 2004 and 2007, more than 45,000 
dwellings were demolished. Bhan, supra note 246, at 128.  Less than twenty-five percent 
of those evicted in the latter period received alternative resettlement sites. Id. 
 299 Analysts view the “clique” of public interest litigators and petitioners who filed 
hundreds of PIL petitions covering almost every aspect of collective life, as being “public 
spirited” and as bringing “a distinct view based on particular sensibilities.” Rajamani, 
supra note 288, at 305–06. 
 300 It has been rightly observed that after the neoliberal turn, the Indian courts 
“emerge[d] as the standard bearers of a whole new transformation of common 
sense. . . . [seeking] to reduce democracy, rather, to redefine it, as a set of abstract rules 
sans politics and people.” MENON AND NIGAM, supra note 228, at 13. 
 301 Okhla Factory Owners’ v.Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory of Delhi, CWP No. 4441/ 
1994 (Nov. 29, 2002), available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/; Pitampura Sudhar Samitii 
v. Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory of Delhi, CWP 4215/1995 (Nov. 29, 2002), available at 
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1927946; Bhan, supra note 246, at 134. 
 302 See Radha D’Souza, The ‘Third World’ and Socio-legal Studies: Neo-Liberalism 
and Lessons from India’s Legal Innovations, 14 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 487, 504–06 (2005). 
 303 MENON & NIGAM, supra note 228, at 69. 
 304 See supra notes 79–107 and accompanying text. 
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or the hardship of monsoons or school examinations.  Today, de-
molitions of slums are being directed on the orders of the courts.305 
How did the courts accomplish this sharp turn in a very 
short span of time?  This was accomplished by deploying the 
whole array of neoliberal values, priorities, and prescriptions 
related to urban policy.  Having mandated resettlement and 
alternate housing for those evicted in earlier decisions, when 
again faced with the question the Supreme Court articulated a 
newfound interest in fiscal responsibility of the state, and linked 
it with implied irresponsibility of the urban poor.306  In 1993, the 
Supreme Court expressed a concern that “the public exchequer 
has to be burdened with crores [tens of millions] of rupees for 
providing alternative accommodation to [those] who are 
trespassers on public land,” and directed that where resettlement 
was done, the resettled should not be given new land on 
leasehold, but on license.307  The short rope of a revocable license 
would keep the “irresponsible” disciplined and controlled. 
The next step was to braid fiscal responsibility with a desire 
for a clean city, and graduate the “irresponsibility” of the poor 
into criminality.  In 1996, the Supreme Court ordered that 
hazardous industries be moved outside the city limits and that 
cities be cleaned up.308  The Delhi High Court was quick to fall in 
line and ordered eviction of all squatters in Delhi because it “is a 
show window to the world of our culture, heritage, traditions and 
way of life.  It cannot be allowed to degenerate and decay.”309  The 
Supreme Court picked up the pace in 2000, bemoaning that while 
Delhi was a “showcase of the country,” yet “no effective initiative 
of any kind” had been taken for “cleaning up the city.”310  The 
Court characterized slums as “large areas of public 
land . . . usurped for private use free of cost,” and a plan to 
provide the free land for resettlement was rejected as “a proposal 
which attracts more land grabbers.  Rewarding an encroacher on 
public land with an alternative free site is like giving a reward to 
a pickpocket.”311  Giving garbage priority over the destitute, the 
 
 305 Rakesh Shukla, Rights of the Poor: An Overview of Supreme Court, ECO. & POL. 
WKLY. 3755, 3757 (2006). 
 306 See Usha Ramanathan, Illegality and the Urban Poor, 41 ECO. & POL. WKLY. 
3193, 3194 (2006). 
 307 Id. 
 308 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1996) 4 S.C.C. 750, available at 
http://www.nlsenlaw.org.; B.L. Wadhera v. Union of India, (1996) 2 S.C.C. 594 (India), 
available at http://www.ielrc.org/content/e960.pdf. 
 309 Samitii, CWP 4215/1995, at 128 (emphasis added). 
 310 Almitra Patel v. Union of India, (2000) 2 S.C.C. 679, 684–85 (India) (emphasis 
added). 
 311 Id. (emphasis added).  The Delhi High Court endorsed this language: “One cannot 
but use the expression as stated in the said [Almitra] judgment.” Wazirpur Barton 
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Court, while castigating provision of adequate housing for the 
poor, mandated that public land be provided free of cost for 
garbage disposal.312  In holding slums responsible for the solid 
waste problem, the Court completely ignored the fact that per 
capita solid waste generation in Delhi runs along class lines.313  
For good measure, the Court retreated from the supervisory role 
in urban affairs that it had aggressively assumed in the earlier 
phase.314  The solid waste management rules adopted in response 
to the Court’s direction, while providing opportunities for private 
companies and incinerators, dealt a blow to the related informal 
sector.315  In Delhi there are an estimated one million waste 
pickers, of which ninety-four percent belong to “backward and 
 
Normata Sangh v. Union of India, MANU/DE/2140/2002 C.W. 2112 of 2002, Order dated 
Nov. 29, 2002.  The Supreme Court articulated the rationale: 
Establishment or creating of slums, it seems, appears to be good business and 
is well organized. The number of slums has multiplied in the last few years by 
geometrical proportion.  Large areas of public land, in this way, are usurped for 
private use free of cost.  It is difficult to believe that this can happen in the 
capital of the country without passive or active connivance of the land owning 
agencies and/or the municipal authorities.  The promise of free land, at the 
taxpayers cost, in place of a jhuggi [shack], is a proposal which attracts more 
land grabbers . . . The department of slum clearance does not seem to have 
cleared any slums despite its being in existence for decades.  In fact more and 
more slums are coming into existence.  Instead of “Slum Clearance” there is 
“Slum Creation” in Delhi.  This in turn gives rise to domestic waste being 
strewn on open land in and around the slums.  This can best be controlled at 
least, in the first instance, by preventing the growth of slums.  The authorities 
must realize that there is a limit to which the population of a city can be 
increased, without enlarging its size.  In other words the density of population 
per square kilometer cannot be allowed to increase beyond the sustainable 
limit.  Creation of slums resulting in increase in density has to be prevented.  
What the slum clearance department has to show, however, does not seem to 
be visible.  It is the garbage and solid waste generated by these slums which 
require to be dealt with most expeditiously and on the basis of priority. 
Almitra Patel, 2 S.C.C. at 3–4 (emphasis added). 
 312 Patel v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1256, 1260–61 (India). 
 313 Per capita solid waste generation in Delhi is 420 grams for the high income group, 
240 grams for middle income groups, 150 grams for lower middle income group, and 80 
grams for those in slums and shacks. Rajamani, supra note 288, at 302.  See also Patel v. 
Union of India, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1256, 1259 (India). 
 314 The Court took the position that: 
We believe it is not for this Court to direct as to how the municipal authorities 
should carry out their functions and resolve difficulties in regard to the 
management of solid waste.  The Court, in fact, is ill-equipped to do so.  
Without doubt the governmental agencies including the local authorities have 
all the powers of the State to take action and ensure that the city remains 
clean.  They only have to wake up and act. 
Patel v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1629, 1633 (India). 
 315  C.P. Jomit, The Impact of Privatization of Solid Waste Collection and 
Transportation in Delhi: The Impact on the Informal Recycling Sector, ARTICLESBASE, 
June 24, 2009, http://www.articlesbase.com/education-articles/the-impact-of-privatization-
of-solid-waste-collection-and-transportation-in-delhi-the-impact-on-the-informal-
recycling-sector-990546.htm. 
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tribal castes,” and an estimated fifty thousand are children.316  
The livelihoods of these workers, who provide “an 
unacknowledged subsidy to the waste producer, the consumer 
goods and packaging industry, and the legal waste owner—the 
municipal body”317—was severely impacted.  In tune with the 
rapidly unfolding, “decisive embourgeoisement of the Indian 
city,”318 a gentrified city, one that was pleasing to the eye with no 
garbage or slum-dwellers in sight, now stood as the judicially 
endorsed image of urban development. 
Having removed “pickpockets,” the Supreme Court now put 
some content in the “show window to the world of our culture, 
heritage, traditions and way of life.”319  It condoned the 
construction of the Akshardham religious theme park in Delhi on 
the Yamuna River floodplain that encroached on an area 
designated in the city’s master plan as an ecological zone.320  In 
2009, the Court cited this decision while approving the 
construction of Commonwealth Games Village adjacent to the 
Akshardham Temple, which the Delhi High Court had found 
“would affect ecological integrity of the ‘riverbed’ besides causing 
irreversible damage to the ‘flood plain.’”321  Coincidently, fire 
“broke out” in the slums adjoining the construction site gutting 
seven shanty clusters,322 further clearing the grounds to facilitate 
global solidarity through the sports festival. 
Responsibilities of the state and fundamental rights brought 
to light only a few years ago remained to be dealt with.  In 2002, 
the Delhi High Court struck down a resettlement policy for 
squatters, and directed that they be removed expeditiously and 
that no alternative sites needed to be provided for removal of 
 
 316 RAVI AGARWAL ET AL., RECYCLING RESPONSIBILITY: TRADITIONAL SYSTEMS AND 
NEW CHALLENGES OF URBAN SOLID WASTE IN INDIA 35–37 (2002); Rajamani, supra note 
288, at 306. 
 317 AGARWAL ET AL., supra note 316, at 35. 
 318 John & Deshpande, supra note 233, at 84. 
 319 Almitra Patel v. Union of India, (2000) 226 S.C.C. 679, slip op. at 1632 (India), 
available at www.elaw.org/system/files/JDESA-Part-4.doc; Pitam Pura Sudhar Samiti v. 
Union of India & Ors., CWP 4215/1995, slip op. at 4 (India 2002), available at 
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/842898/. 
 320 Charu Soni, Killing Delhi’s Lifeline, TEHELKA, Sept. 9, 2010, 
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main18.asp?filename=Cr081906Killing_Delhi.asp; Sanjay 
Srivastava, Urban Spaces, Disney-Divinity and Moral Middle Classes in Delhi, 44 ECON. 
& POL. WKLY. 338, 338–39 (2009). 
 321 D.D.A. v. Rajendra Singh & Ors., 161 D.L.T. 330, slip op. at 2 (India 2009), 
http://www.nlsenlaw.org/water/case-laws/supreme-court/appellants-d-d-a-vs-respondent-
rajendra-singh-and-ors-decided-on-30-07.2009-1/; No Bar on Games Work, Orders 
Supreme Court, THE HINDU, July 31, 2009, available at http://www.thehindu.com/2009/ 
07/31/stories/2009073157570100.htm. 
 322 Fire in Delhi Slum near Commonwealth Games Village, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Jan. 9, 
2010, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print/495495.aspx. 
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those squatting on public land.323  While recognizing the “duty of 
the Government authorities to provide shelter to the under-
privileged,” it argued that the failure to do so does not mean that 
the state should be required to take up an “arbitrary system of 
providing alternative sites and land to encroachers on public 
land.”324  The judicially recognized fundamental right to adequate 
housing evaporated into thin air.  Now the Court told squatters 
facing imminent removal: “[I]f you are occupying illegal land, you 
have no legal right, what to talk of fundamental right, to stay 
there a minute longer.”325  The specter of anarchy and breakdown 
of order was raised to deny any relief to squatters: “If 
encroachments on public land are to be allowed, there will be 
anarchy.”326 
To guard against the specter of anarchy, the courts started to 
cast a shadow on citizenship rights of the urban poor and slum-
dwellers.  Two classes of citizens emerged—those rightfully 
entitled to protections of the law, and those who had surrendered 
such rights on account of being poor.  Now courts distinguished 
between slum-dwellers who were designated “unscrupulous 
citizens,” and the “honest citizens who have to pay for land or a 
flat.”327  And, of course, finance capital and developers were to be 
given a complete run of the field.  In 2006, the Delhi High Court, 
while refusing to stop slum-demolitions without any alternative 
site for resettlement, argued that the land had “other uses that 
cannot be denied,” and expressed the frustration that the more 
extra-legal settlers are removed, the “more they come.”328  
Deploying a discourse of epidemics and pathology to characterize 
squatters and slum-dwellers, the Court argued that “their” 
numbers were “growing and growing,” and hence urgent steps 
must be taken to “deal with the problem.”329  The ultimate 
prescription was rather simple: “If they cannot afford to live in 
Delhi, let them not come to Delhi.”330 
Then there are those who can “afford” it all and merit 
deference by the law and the courts.  In the middle of demolition 
and clean-up drives, the Supreme Court allowed the construction 
of a shopping mall, which was being built illegally, to continue.331  
 
 323 Okla. Factory Owners’ Ass’n v. Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory of Delhi & Ors., 
108 D.L.T. 517, slip op. at 13 (India 2002), http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1143856/. 
 324 Id. at 11. 
 325 Ramanathan, supra note 306, at 3197 (emphasis added). 
 326 Id. (emphasis added). 
 327 Bhan, supra note 246, at 135 (emphasis added). 
 328 Id. (emphasis added). 
 329 Id. (emphasis added). 
 330 Id. (emphasis added). 
 331 ROY, supra note 260, at 134. 
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The rationale for disparate treatment of corporate capital was 
articulated: 
Had such parties inkling of an idea that such clearances were not 
obtained by DDA [the builders], they would not have invested such 
huge sums of money.  The stand that wherever constructions have 
been made unauthorizedly [sic] demolition is the only option cannot 
apply to the present cases . . . [especially] when they . . . are corporate 
bodies and institutions and the question of their having indulged in 
any malpractices in getting the approval or sanction does not arise.332 
The Supreme Court also used the “huge sums of money” 
rationale in the Vedanta Group Case, where bauxite mining 
operations in Niyamgiri, Orissa, an environmentally fragile area 
home to indigenous tribal groups, were approved despite multiple 
irregularities and strong objections of residents of the area.333 
Emboldened by this judicial posture, the Delhi Laws (Special 
Provisions) Act 2006 was adopted, which provides for demolition 
of unauthorized structures, “whether in pursuance of Court 
orders or otherwise.”334  This Act gave license for the removal of 
slums where “clearance of land is required for specific public 
projects,” and “the Central Government may, from time to time, 
issue such directions to the local authorities as it may deem fit, 
for giving effect to the provisions of this Act and it shall be the 
duty of the local authorities to comply with such directions.”335  
The end result of judicial, legislative, and executive actions is 
increased “segregation of economic classes” in Delhi.336  A 
“develop-ment pornography”337 has flourished where slum-
dwellers and squatters are held responsible for “pressure on civic 
amenities, crime, social imbalances, economic exploitation, 
 
 332 Id. (quoting the Writ Petition Against Vasant Junj Mall, Oct. 17, 2006, judgment 
of Justices Arijit Pasayat and S. H. Kpadia) (emphasis added).  This pattern led to the 
observation that “it is members of the so-called civil society who break laws with impunity 
and who demand that the rules be waived for them, whereas members of political society 
strive to become legal, to gain recognition and entitlements from the state.” Amita 
Baviskar & Nandini Sundar, Democracy versus Economic Transformation?, 43 ECON. & 
POL. WKLY. 87, 88 (2008). 
 333 Rahul Choudhary, Environmental Clearance: A Farce Played by MoEF—The 
Vedanta Case, RADICAL NOTES JOURNAL, Sept. 24, 2007, available at 
http://radicalnotes.com/journal/2007/09/24/the-vedanta-case/. 
 334 The Delhi Laws (Special Provisions Act, 2006 (No. 22 of 2006)), available at 
http://www.delhi.gov.in/DoIT/Finance/PDF/Acts%20and%20Rules/specialprovisionalAct.p
df.  See also Ramanathan, supra note 306, at 3197. 
 335 The Delhi Laws (Special Provisions Act, 2006 (No. 22 of 2006)), available at 
http://www.delhi.gov.in/DoIT/Finance/PDF/Acts%20and%20Rules/specialprovisionalAct.p
df.  See also Ramanathan, supra note 305, at 3197. 
 336 Nikhil Joseph & Pascal Goodman, On the Outskirts of Legality: Policy and Legal 
Aspects of Slum Resettlement in Delhi 19 (2008) (unpublished working paper) (on file with 
the Centre for Civil Society), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1325962. 
 337 Rotimi Sankore, Behind the Image: Poverty and “Development Pornography,” 
PAMBAZUKA NEWS (Apr. 21, 2005), http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/27815. 
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unplanned growth, deterioration of city beautification, culture, 
environmental setback to city development in a planned manner 
etc.”338  Abdication of public responsibility for housing today 
stands enshrined in the Delhi Master Plan 2021, which envisages  
private developers catering to the housing needs of the “urban 
poor and the economically weaker sections in the form of houses 
of two rooms or less.”339  The turn from a welfare state to coercive 
facilitator of capital accumulation stands completed.340  Slums 
and slum-dwellers were left at the turn, with profound 
implications for the place and role of the law. 
The neoliberal transition did not only shape judicial 
philosophy of the Indian high courts regarding the questions of 
poverty and shelter, it also appears to have compromised the 
integrity of the judges.  This is put into sharp relief by the still-
unfolding corruption and conflict of interest scandal that erupted 
in 2007, and centered on Y. K. Sabharwal, Chief Justice of the 
Indian Supreme Court from 2000–2007.341  Chief Justice 
Sabharwal took the lead role in the Supreme Court’s denial to 
 
 338 Joseph & Goodman, supra note 336, at 13 (quoting Detailed Project Report: 
Construction of Four Storied E.W.S. Housing for Slum Dwellers at Savdha Ghevra Phase 
III under INNURM, Slum and JJ Department, Municipal Corporation of Delhi (Jan. 
2008)). 
 339 Id. at 19 (quoting Master Plan for Delhi with the perspective for the year 2021, 
Ministry of Urban Development (February 2007)). 
 340 Evictions, removals, and demolitions of the housing and livelihood of the urban 
poor were not the only areas that were impacted by this judicial turn.  In the area of 
workers’ rights, during the progressive PIL phase, the courts had set up principles of 
“equal pay for equal work,” “regularization of contract workers performing work of a 
permanent nature,” and “[r]einstatement with back wages.” Randhir Singh v. Union of 
India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 879 (India); Shukla, supra note 305, at 3757.  With the neoliberal 
turn, the courts diluted the “equal pay” and “regularization” rules and adopted a posture 
of non-interference in cases of harsh and disproportionate punishments like dismissal of 
employees for minor infractions. State of N.C.T. of Delhi v. Sanjeev, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 2080, 
2084–87 (India);; D. P. S. Rural Reg’l Bank v. Munna Lal Jain, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 584, 589 
(India).  Concerns of irreparable environmental harm and dislocation of indigenous tribal 
communities were pushed to the side as the court approved the construction of a mega-
dam as part of the largest river valley project in India. Narmada Bachao Andholan v. 
Union of India & Ors., A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 3751, 3752–55, 3782 (India).  “The dam is neither 
a nuclear establishment nor a polluting industry . . .  [I]t will not be correct to presume 
that the construction of a large dam like Sardar Sarovar will result in ecological disaster.” 
Id. at 3753.  As for the displacement of tribal communities, the court took the position 
that at the rehabilitation sites “there will be better facilities than in the tribal hamlets,” 
and the tribal communities will be “gradually assimilated in the mainstream of society.” 
MENON & NIGAM, supra note 228, at 74.  In the Networking of Rivers Case, the Supreme 
Court used Public Interest Litigation to intervene in inter-state and federation-state 
relations, and tilted the balance of power in favor of the central government while 
brushing aside environmental and federalism concerns. D’Souza, supra note 302, at 488, 
506. 
 341 Sanjay Dubey, Office for Profit: A Stink You Should Smell. TEHELKA, Aug. 18, 
2007, available at http://www.tehelka.com/story_main33.asp?filename= 
Ne180807Officefor.asp; Former Chief Justice of India Y.K. Sabharwal—Biography, 
http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/judges/bio/yks.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2010). 
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provide any relief against demolition and sealing of thousands of 
“illegal” commercial units operating in areas reserved for 
residential use by Delhi’s city plans.342  The sealing impacted 
thousands of peoples’ lives, and violent protest erupted.343  A 
bench headed by Chief Justice Sabharwal insisted that the 
sealing continue.344  Within months of his retirement, an 
investigative report was published detailing that two sons of the 
Chief Justice, who ran three companies from their father’s house, 
made millions as a result of the sealing drive that forced scores of 
businesses to move to shopping malls and commercial complexes 
in which the sons had financial interests.345  Corporate 
developers had rushed into partnerships with the sons as the 
sealing drive gathered speed.346  While the Chief Justice suffered 
some embarrassment, the four journalists who published the 
account were found guilty of criminal contempt of court by the 
Delhi High Court.347  This is not the only scandal to implicate 
India’s high courts.348 
The Supreme Court of India had long recognized that, “it is 
an accepted fact of constitutional interpretation that the content 
of justiciability changes according to how the Judge’s value 
preferences respond to the multi-dimensional problems of the 
day.”349  Indeed, the Court deemed “inevitable that the social 
philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in 
the decision should play an important part” in their decision-
making.350  As for the “social philosophy” and “value preferences” 
of the judges, it has been argued that their shared class 
affiliation and residing in Delhi makes them sympathetic to the 
middle class sensibilities about urban issues.351  This affiliation 
 
 342 For details of the affair, see ROY, supra note 331, at 1132.  For details of the 
charges, see Prashant Bhushan, Contempt of Judicial Power, OUTLOOK INDIA, Sept. 19, 
2007,  http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?235601. 
 343 Arundhati Roy, Scandal In the Palace, OUTLOOK INDIA, Oct. 1, 2007, available at 
http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?235689. 
 344 Id. 
 345 Dubey, supra note 341. 
 346 Id. 
 347 Binod Ringania, Journalists Sentenced for Uncovering Corruption, WORLD PRESS, 
Sept. 25, 2007, http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/2941.cfm. 
 348 Prashant Bhushan, Judging the Judges, OUTLOOK INDIA, Jan. 21, 2009, available 
at http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?239534. 
 349 Rajamani, supra note 288, at 301 (quoting State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, 
(1977) 3 S.C.C. 592, 648 (India)). 
 350 State of Madras v. V. G. Row, (1952) 1957 S.C.R. 597, slip op. at 8 (India), 
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/554839. 
 351 Rajamani, supra note 288, at 301.  See also Partha Chatterjee, Are Indian Cities 
Becoming Bourgeois at Last? Or, If You Prefer, We Could Exclaim: Are Indian Cities 
Becoming Bourgeois, Alas?, in CONTESTED TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 35, at 113, 113–
14 (Mary E. John et al. eds., 2006);; Janaki Nair, ‘Social Municipalism’ and the New 
Metropolis, in CONTESTED TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 35, at 125, 125. 
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and sympathy makes for not only substantive outcomes of these 
cases but also the modes of resolving them that signal a new 
modality of functioning of the state, whereby policy making 
increasingly becomes the preserve of professional and 
technocrats immune from political control.  In the Solid Waste 
Management Case, the Court was quick to set up a committee of 
experts to design rules and guidelines for waste management.352  
This committee, like others the Court had set up for similar 
issues, for example, in the Delhi Pollution Case,353 consisted of 
technocrats, bureaucrats, and repre-sentatives of NGOs, without 
any mechanism to represent the interests of those who would be 
impacted by the decisions—the squatters and slum-dwellers.354  
The process was not “structured to be participative” and was 
“neither consultative nor democratic.”355 
Activists note the “technology focus” of the courts’ agenda 
and that the solutions devised and recommended were driven by 
a priority for “leaner municipalities and greater efficiency.”356  
Decisions about whom to consult were “ad hoc and 
discretionary . . . . Not all stake holders were identified and 
consulted, and no avenues for wider public consultation were 
explored.”357 The non-participatory process resulted in the 
absence of equity, fairness, and justice.358  In its new guise, PIL 
was unhinged from citizen mobilization and yoked with the 
interests of those with social power.  A device fashioned to give 
access to the marginalized, now became a “tremendous practical 
hurdle[] limiting the access of the poor to the Court, and 
therefore restricting the range of views before the Court.”359  The 
well-heeled groups are using “their leverage with the Court” to 
ensure conversion of “one strain of opinion into policy, while 
annihilating all others.”360  Such machinations are dictated by 
the neo-liberalism whereby “in the current period, legitimate 
human rights can be defined only as that set of rights that 
require government abstention from acts that violate the 
individual’s freedom to innovate and to invest time, capital, and 
 
 352 Okla. Factory Owners’ Ass’n v. Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory of Delhi, (2002) 108 
D.L.T. 517, slip op. at 4 (India), available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1143856/. 
 353 M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 4016 (India), available at 
http://www.ielrc.org/content/e0409.pdf. 
 354 See generally Rajamani, supra note 288, at 296–301. 
 355 Id. at 304. 
 356 Id. 
 357 Id. at 304–05. 
 358 Id. at 305. 
 359 Id. at 306. 
 360 Id. at 305–06. 
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resources in processes of production and exchange.”361  For 
example, in Mumbai, an emerging middle class has teamed up 
with property developers and select bureaucrats and politicians 
to create a “powerful neoliberal lobby [of] . . . building 
boomers.”362  The emergence of the “upwardly mobile middle and 
elite class . . . [with an] anti-slum agenda is . . . one of the most 
significant changes in the Indian urban landscape.”363 
With these neoliberal judicial pronouncements, extra-legality 
stands bifurcated: that of the “unscrupulous,” “pickpockets,” and 
“encroachers” and that of “honest citizens;” that of “who cannot 
afford to live in Delhi” and that of those with “huge sums of 
money.”364  Law is supposed to discipline the extra-legality of the 
first set, while not even raising “the question” about the extra-
legality of the latter.  On the grounds of this divide, sovereignty 
emerges as a decision on the exception—setting up zones beyond 
the reach of the law.365  This divide implicates the very concept of 
citizenship by reconstituting the grounds of recognition of a 
citizen.  The characterizations deployed by the courts may well 
be essentialist categories reinforcing stereotypes, but “cat-
egories . . . are not meant to describe the world accurately but to 
organize and classify it symbolically.”366  The language about 
slum and pavement dwellers that took hold of Indian judicial 
 
 361 Tony Evans, Citizenship and Human Rights in the Age of Globalization, 25 
ALTERNATIVES 415, 416 (2000). 
 362 Nainan, supra note 198, at 30. 
 363 Amita Bhide, Shifting Terrains of Communities and Community Organizations: 
Reflections on Organizing for Housing Rights in Mumbai, 44 CMTY. DEV. J. 367, 375 
(2009). 
 364 Bhan, supra note 246, at 135–39. 
 365 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 19 (Daniel 
Heller-Roazen trans., 1998).  Agamben takes as his point of departure Schmitt’s claim 
that “[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception.” CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL 
THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans., 
Mass. Inst. of Tech. 1985).  Agamben argues that the formation of a political community is 
based not on inclusion but on exclusion. See generally Jenny Edkins, Sovereign Power, 
Zones of Indistinction and the Camp, 25 ALTERNATIVES 3 (2000).  He deploys the figure of 
homo sacer from Roman law to identify a zone where law suspends itself, rendering the 
zone not merely of exclusion but also of abandonment—the space of the exception. Id.  For 
a critical reading, see generally Peter Fitzpatrick, Bare Sovereignty: Homo Sacer and the 
Insistence of Law, in POLITICS, METAPHYSICS, AND DEATH: ESSAYS ON GIORGIO AGAMBEN’S 
HOMO SACER 49 (Andrew Norris ed., 2005); GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 
(Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2005).  Creation of a space on exception is a 
question of the boundaries and borders of law, in that the sovereign decision and the 
exception are “never decisively placed within or without the legal system, as they are 
precisely the moving border between the two.” Andrew Norris, The Exemplary Exception, in 
119 RADICAL PHIL. 6, 10 (2003) (emphasis added).  The critical result is that those placed 
in the zones of exception are included as objects of power but excluded from being 
subjects. 
 366 TERESA P.R. CALDEIRA, CITY OF WALLS: CRIME, SEGREGATION, AND CITIZENSHIP IN 
SAÕ PAULO 33 (2000). 
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pronouncements since the 1990s, is that of illegality.367  The 
courts appear mindful that in a constitutional liberal republic “in 
order, ethically, to justify denying a national citizen his text-
based rights, it becomes necessary to make the informal settler 
into an ‘improper’ citizen.”368  The courts have done just that by 
characterizing slum and pavement dwellers as dishonest, 
unscrupulous, polluters, and predatory encroachers.  Rendered 
an “improper citizen,” the “encroacher” can now be denied the 
protections of rights of citizenship.369  The political economy of 
slum production stands erased, the slum and the slum-dweller 
emerge as a space and a body without history, and 
responsibilities of the state stand vitiated.  This is the legacy of 
neoliberalism in India. 
Is there a way out for urban slums and slum-dwellers?  We 
turn now to examine the prescriptions that hold the field. 
V.  “WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?”370 
A. Slums and Remedial Prescriptions 
By the 1970s it was apparent that in the global South, even 
in the face of persistent urban unemployment, rural-urban 
migration was accelerating and so was slum growth.371  The 
urban bias of development plans, deeper penetration of the 
markets into rural areas, restructuring of the agricultural sector 
by WTO trade regimes, and increased capital-intensive nature of 
agricultural inputs combined to dispossess and uproot increasing 
numbers of rural farmers.372  Actual and perceived wage 
differentials lure rural workers to urban centers, where they 
cannot all be absorbed in the sector with a “politically determined 
wage that is substantially higher than . . . [that of] the 
agricultural sector.”373  Consequently, increasing numbers of the 
 
 367 See Usha Ramanathan, Illegality and Exclusion: Law in the Lives of Slum 
Dwellers, in 4 KEY TEXTS ON SOCIAL JUSTICE IN INDIA 263, 281–82 (2009). 
 368 Bhan, supra note 246, at 139. 
 369 Id. 
 370 I adopt this from MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS 
OR COMMUNITY? (1967), where Dr. King focuses on questions of class and poverty. 
 371 John R. Harris & Michael P. Todaro, Migration, Unemployment and Development: 
A Two-Sector Analysis, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 126, 126 (1970).  See also SANYAL, supra note 
77, at 197. 
 372 See Carlos Oya, Sticks and Carrots for Farmers in Developing Countries: Agrarian 
Neoliberalism in Theory and Practice, in NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER, supra note 
108, at 127, 127–131; JAN BREMAN, OF PEASANTS, MIGRANTS, AND PAUPERS: RURAL 
LABOUR CIRCULATION AND CAPITALIST PRODUCTION IN WEST INDIA XVII, XX  (1986); PETER 
M. ROSSET, FOOD IS DIFFERENT: WHY WE MUST GET THE WTO OUT OF AGRICULTURE XV–
XVII (2006); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the 
Environment: The Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development, 14 TRANSNAT’L. 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 419, 470–71 (2004). 
 373 SANYAL, supra note 77, at 197. 
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urban poor joined the informal sector set apart from the formal 
labor market, characterized by formal contracts and statutory 
regulations.374  In little time it was recognized that: 
[T]he informal sector now stands out ‘as a potential provider of 
employment and incomes to millions of people who would otherwise 
lack the means of survival’ or ‘as a breeding ground for 
entrepreneurship on a mass scale’ . . . .  [T]he informal sector can 
significantly improve itself, practically in each aspect of its 
functioning, if only the past policy biases, under which it is denied 
access to the advantages (e.g., availability of credit, foreign exchange, 
and tax concessions) offered to the formal sector, are removed.375 
Divergent views about the nature of the informal sector fall 
into three main schools of thought: the dualist school, the legalist 
school, and the structural school.376  The dualist and legalist 
schools furnish the scaffoldings of mainstream prescriptions for 
the informal sector.  Assumptions drawn from the Fordist era in 
the global North view the informal sector “as a waiting room, or 
temporary transit zone: newcomers could find their feet there 
and learn the ways of the urban labour market.”377  In the 
meantime, abysmal wages in the informal sector are expected to 
be mitigated by traditional support networks.378  The informal 
sector, however, grew exponentially as neoliberal globalization 
gathered speed with flexible production, outsourcing, fiscal 
 
 374 The vagueness and plurality of views of informality are so pervasive that, by one 
account, “formal and informal are better thought of as metaphors that conjure up a 
mental picture of whatever the user has in mind at that particular time.” MARC 
BACCHETTA ET AL., GLOBALIZATION AND INFORMAL JOBS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 40 
(2009). 
 375 INT’L LAB. ORG., JOB CREATION IN URBAN INFORMAL SECTOR IN INDIA: ISSUES AND 
POLICY OPTIONS 4 (A. S. Oberai & G. K. Chadha eds., 2001) (emphasis added). 
 376 The dualist school posits that the informal sector is comprised of marginal 
activities—distinct from and not related to the formal sector—that provide income for the 
poor and a safety net in times of crisis. Chen, supra note 113, at 4, 6–7.  Accordingly, the 
persistence of informal activities is due largely to the fact that not enough modern job 
opportunities have been created to absorb surplus labor, due to a slow rate of economic 
growth and/or to a faster rate of population growth. Id.  The legalist school subscribes to 
the notion that the informal sector is comprised of microentrepreneurs who choose to 
operate informally in order to avoid the costs, time, and effort of formal registration. Id.  
It posits that microentrepreneurs will continue to produce informally so long as 
regulations in the formal sector are cumbersome and costly, and thus stifle private 
enterprise. Id.  The structuralist school, one that is in tune with my position, sees the 
informal sector as subordinate economic units and workers that serve to reduce input and 
labor costs, and thereby increase the competitiveness of large capitalist firms. Id.  In the 
structuralist model, in marked contrast to the dualist model, different modes and forms of 
production are seen not only to co-exist but also to be inextricably connected and 
interdependent. Id.  According to this school, the nature of capitalist development, rather 
than a lack of growth, accounts for the persistence and growth of informal production 
relationships. Id. 
 377 Breman, supra note 151, at 34. 
 378 Id. at 35. 
Do Not Delete 12/12/2010 7:34 PM 
2010] “Surplus  Humanity”  and  the  Margins  of Legality 57 
austerity, and structural adjustment of economies.379  While the 
Wall Street Journal expected the informal sector to serve as “one 
of the last safe havens . . . a critical safety net as the economic 
crisis spreads,”380 a detailed study finds that “incomes have 
declined, days of work available decreased, prices have fallen and 
livelihoods disappeared.”381 
World Bank prescriptions play a defining role in shaping the 
policies of governments, other development agencies, and 
technocratic consultants.382  The new orthodoxy in urban policy 
speaks of improving rather than replacing slums.  The 
prescription offered for housing needs of the poor is “self-help” in 
combination with privatization of housing supply across the 
board.  The populist and seemingly benign mantra of “helping-
the-poor-to-help-themselves” furnishes a smokescreen for the 
abandonment of the obligation of the states to relieve poverty 
and homelessness, and turns attention away from structural 
changes at the state and global levels necessary for sustainable 
urban and housing policies that may ensure secure housing with 
dignity for all.383  Slogans like “people’s participation” become 
thinly disguised euphemisms for the abdication by the state of its 
fundamental responsibilities toward its citizens.  While some 
have demonstrated that “self-housing” is a myth as far as paid 
artisans and skilled labor is involved,384 others have documented 
that due to “cost-recovery” provisions of World Bank lending for 
low-income housing, the bottom thirty to sixty percent of the 
population was unable to meet the financial obligations of such 
loans.385  ILO’s experts concluded that the World Bank’s slum 
upgrading had failed to have any substantial impact.386 
 
 379 BACCHETTA ET AL., supra note 374, at 40; Alan Gilbert, Love in the Time of 
Enhanced Capital Flows: Reflections on the Links Between Liberalization and Informality, 
in URBAN INFORMALITY, supra note 176, at 33, 33–34, 37; Patralekha Chatterjee, Shadow 
Lives: Urban India’s Informal Economy, 5:3 HABITAT DEBATE (1999), 
http://ww2.unhabitat.org/mdg/documents/asia/Vol5_No3_urban_indias_informal_economy
.doc. 
 380 Patrick Barta, The Rise of the Underground, WALL ST. J., March 14, 2009, at W1. 
 381 We Are Self Employed, SELF-EMPLOYED WOMEN’S ASSOCIATION OF INDIA (SEWA, 
Gujarat, India) May 15, 2009, available at http://www.ifwea.org/news/2009/ 
affiliateAnnounce/090604SEWAnewsletter.pdf.  In the case of waste collectors in 
Ahmedabad, the city used by the WSJ to draw examples, between April 2008 and January 
2009 incomes fell to between thirty-seven and seventy percent. Id. 
 382 See Ramin Keivani & E Werna, Modes of Housing Provision in Developing 
Countries, 55 PROGRESS IN PLANNING 65, 86 (2001). 
 383 See SEABROOK, supra note 175, at 196–97. 
 384 Kavita Datta & Gareth Jones, From Self-help to Self-Finance: The Changing 
Focus of Urban Research and Policy, in HOUSING AND FINANCE IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 3, 11–12 (Kavita Datta & Gareth Jones eds., 2000). 
 385 See generally Lisa Peattie, Affordability, in 11 HABITAT INT’L 69, 69–76 (1987). 
 386 OBERAI, supra note 5, at 122. 
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The “self-help” prescription is complemented by the World 
Bank’s calls for a “market-enabling” strategy: curtail direct 
public intervention in housing and lift restraints from private 
land and housing market to let commodity circulation penetrate 
into lower-income groups.387  The prescription has simply not 
worked. Experts conclude that  
the market-enabling approach neglects urban poor because it 
overemphasizes the formal market process to the detriment of other 
existing modes of provision, it lacks specific consideration of informal 
markets and their particular requirements and it fails to consider who 
benefits from the increased market efficiency.388 
The market-enabling approach is inappropriate for housing 
needs of the urban poor in the global South because formal 
markets do not respond adequately to rapid urban growth, 
poverty, chaotic economic conditions, and the deficiencies of 
infrastructure and services.389  More often the result is excessive 
speculation and monopoly behavior for maximizing profits, which 
drive up land and housing prices without significant access to 
mortgage or building finance by low-income groups.390  One 
affected resident asks: “Whose problem does it solve?”391 
At this juncture the myth of the informal worker as 
entrepreneur was born.392  This was also the point of entry of the 
legalist school which viewed the informal sector as constituted by 
 
 387 WORLD BANK, HOUSING: ENABLING MARKETS TO WORK 1–2 (1993); G. A. Jones and 
K. Datta, Enabling Markets to Work: Housing Policy in the ‘New’ South Africa, 5:3 INT’L 
PLANNING STUD. 393, 395–97 (2000); R. Harris and C. Giles, A Mixed Message: The Agents 
and Forms on International Housing Policy, 1945-1973, 27 HABITAT INT’L 167, 174, 176–
78 (2003); WORLD BANK, URBAN POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN AGENDA FOR 
THE 1990S 6–7 (1991); A. Jones and P. E. Ward, The World Bank’s ‘New’ Urban 
Management Program: Paradigm Shift or Policy Continuity?, 18 HABITAT INT’L 33, 35 
(1994). 
 388 Ramin Keivani, Michael Mattingly and Hamid Majedi, Public Management of 
Urban Land, Enabling Markets and Low-Income Housing Provision: The Overlooked 
Experience of Iran, 45:9 URBAN STUDIES 1825, 1827 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 
 389 See V. Mukhija, Enabling Slum Redevelopment in Mumbai: Policy Paradox in 
Practice, 16:6 HOUSING STUDIES 791, 791 (2001); V. Mukhija, The Contradictions in 
Enabling Private Developers of Affordable Housing: A Cautionary Case from Ahmerabad, 
India, 41 URBAN STUDIES 1, 3 (2004). 
 390 See R. Keivani and E. Werna, Modes of Housing Provision in Developing 
Countries, 55 PROGRESS IN PLANNING 65, 69 (2001); R. Keivani and E. Werna, Refocusing 
the Housing Debate in Developing Counties from a Pluralist Perspective, 25 HABITAT INT’L 
191, 201 (2001); R. BAKEN AND J. VAN DER LINDEN, LAND DELIVERY FOR LOW INCOME 
GROUPS IN THIRD WORLD CITIES 12, 45 (1992). See generally W. P. Strassmann, 
Oversimplification in Housing Analysis, with Reference to Land Markets and Mobility, 11 
CITIES 377 (1994). 
 391 See generally Priscilla Connolly, Uncontrolled Settlements and Self-Built: What 
Kind of Solution? The Mexico City Case, in SELF-HELP HOUSING: A CRITIQUE 141 (Peter 
M. Ward ed., 1982). 
 392 See Rebecca B. Galemba, Informal and Illicit Entrepreneurs: Fighting for a Place 
in the Neoliberal Economic Order, 29:2 ANTHROPOLOGY OF WORK REVIEW 19, 19 (2008). 
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voluntary micro-entrepreneurs, who were a reservoir for future 
growth if only regulatory reforms would lower the cost of entry 
and operation in the formal sector.  It was claimed that those 
who work in the informal sector do so “because they choose to be 
self-employed, using skills acquired in the formal sector to 
establish themselves as independent producers or traders.”393  
The premise is that they are there “not because they were 
redundant to the formal sector but because they chose to be self-
employed.”394  However, the reality is that far from choosing to do 
so, those in the informal sector are shut out or ejected from the 
formal sectors though a combination of global, national, and local 
impacts of neoliberal structuring of public policies and the 
introduction of “flexible production,” whereby capital seeks to 
engage labor located outside the regimes of formal contract, labor 
rights, and public regulation.395  The result is “immiserisation of 
the laboring poor.”396 
Given the rising value of increasingly scarce land in and 
around urban areas, squatting usually operates through an 
invisible and informal real estate market.397  Calling informal 
subdivision settlements “extra legal rather than illegal,” analysts 
point out that often those shut out of the formal housing market 
buy lots from entrepreneurs who acquire tracts of undeveloped 
land and subdivide it without conforming to any regulations, and 
the area is incrementally upgraded, yielding ever-increasing 
returns for the land owners.398  This model of privatized 
urbanization is also, in effect, the privatization of squatting.  In 
some instances, owners of nonresidential tracts even encourage 
squatters to organize themselves as a land invasion in the 
expectation that the state may be forced to regularize the 
settlement and develop infrastructure.399  In another model, 
squatters purchase the “right” to dwell on state-owned land from 
corrupt politicians and bureaucrats.  Often it is middlemen who 
secure possession, provide protection against eviction, and supply 
 
 393 HAROLD LUBELL, THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN THE 1980S AND 1990S 112 (1991). 
 394 Id. 
 395 See Jan Breman, An Informalized Labor System: End of Labor Market Dualism, 
36:52 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 4804, 4807 (2002); N. Neetha, Flexible Production, 
Feminisation and Disorganisation: Evidence from Tiruppur Knitwear Industry, 37:21 
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2045, 2049–51 (2002). 
 396 Breman, supra note 395, at 4813. 
 397 See generally Paul Baross, Sequencing Land Development: The Price Implications 
of Legal and Illegal Settlement Growth, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAND SUPPLY 
SYSTEMS IN THIRD WORLD CITIES 69 (Paul Baross & Jan van der Linden eds., 1990). 
 398 RAKESH MOHAN, UNDERSTANDING THE DEVELOPING METROPOLIS: LESSONS FROM 
THE CITY STUDY OF BOGOTA AND CALI, COLUMBIA 152–53 (1994). 
 399 DAVID KEELING, BUENOS AIRES: GLOBAL DREAMS, LOCAL CRISES 107–08 (1996). 
Do Not Delete 12/12/2010 7:34 PM 
60 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 14:1 
water and transport facilities.400  The result is an informal extra-
legal economy and the commercialization of slums.401 
The heralded guru of the legalist school, Hernando de Soto, 
posits that the solution for cities of the global South is the 
granting of property rights to slum-dwellers, which will turn 
their extralegal holdings into liquid capital thus alleviating the 
need for external capital investments for job creation.402  He 
asserts that “trillions of dollars, [are] ready to be put to use if 
only the mystery of how assets are transformed into live capital 
can be unraveled.”403  Citing the failures of the legal system in 
Peru, de Soto recommends legalization of extralegal landholdings 
coupled with deregularization of the economy including 
housing.404  Contra to de Soto’s prescription about the injection of 
 
 400 AKHTER HAMEED KHAN, ORANGI PILOT PROJECT: REMINISCENES AND REFLECTIONS 
72 (1996). 
 401 Ayse Yonder, Implications of Double Standards in Housing Policy: Development of 
Informal Settlements in Istanbul, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 55, 61–62 (Edesio Fernandes & Ann Varley eds., 1998) 
[hereinafter ILLEGAL CITIES]. 
 402 See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO 
TERRORISM 159–60 (1989) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH]; HERNANDO DE SOTO, 
THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS 
EVERYWHERE ELSE 37 (2000) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL].  Heralds 
of capitalism were quick to endorse De Soto’s recipe. See Why the Poor Need Property 
Rights: Want to Make the Poor Less Poor? Give Them Title to What They Own, 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2001.  The World Bank adopted his recommendations too. WORLD 
BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: A BETTER INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR 
EVERYONE (2004).  De Soto’s career as a protégé of Friedrick Hayek, and his grooming and 
promotion by the Free Market Project at the University of Chicago, Mont Pelerin Society 
of neoliberal intellectuals, and the Atlas Foundation for Economic Research is well 
documented. See, e.g., Timothy Mitchell, The Work of Economics: How a Discipline Makes 
its World, in XLVI:2. ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE 297, 304–09 (2005) 
[hereinafter Mitchell, The Work of Economics].  At the urging of Hayek, the Atlas 
Foundation helped set up and fund de Soto’s Institute for Liberty and Democracy, one of 
the first neoliberal think tanks of the global South.  While he grew up in Geneva, started 
his career at GATT, and was the head of the International Council of Copper Exporting 
Countries, his credibility came to depend on his identity as a neoliberal from the South.  
The Center for International Private Enterprise, set up by the Reagan Administration 
started funding de Soto’s Institute in the 1980s.  De Soto became the principal political 
advisor for Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori in 1990 and presided over the drastic 
neoliberal restructuring of Peru’s economy that resulted in a deep recession whereby 
within two years wages fell by forty percent and the proportion of Peruvians living in 
poverty increased by fifty-four percent. See Kenneth M. Roberts, Neoliberalism and the 
Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case, 48 WORLD POLITICS 82, 
96 (1996).  De Soto’s Institute started its pilot titling program in Lima.  In 1996 The 
Peruvian government adopted a law on poverty formalization, and in 1998 the World 
Bank started funding the program.  However, research funded by the World Bank showed 
that property titling had produced no increase in credit to the poor, the primary goal of 
the program. See Mitchell, The Work of Economics, supra note 402, at 308 (2005). 
 403 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 402, at 37.  For a critical analysis 
of de Soto’s ideas, see Mitchell, The Work of Economics, supra note 402, at 299; Ann 
Varley, Private or Public: Debating the Meaning of Tenure Legalization, 26 INT’L J. URB. & 
REGIONAL RES. 449, 449–50 (2002). 
 404 DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 402, at 177, 182, 255–58. 
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the law into the informal sector, the informal and extra-legal 
sector is not separate and apart from the formal and legal one.  It 
is produced by operations of the market and the state that have 
the “power to determine . . . what is informal and what is not, 
and to determine what forms of informality will thrive and which 
will disappear.”405 
De Soto’s claim that the global South is “exactly where 
Europe, Japan, and the United States were a couple of hundred 
years ago,”406 utterly glosses over the colonial encounter and its 
impact.  He ignores the “process of primitive accumulation that 
force[s] people into the cities,” and sidesteps questions about who 
owns capital now, and how it is deployed.407  He seeks to research 
“folk conventions” around property rights to be incorporated into 
the modern property regimes.408  Others also celebrate the 
multiplicity of informal legal norms that animate property 
relations in extra-legal urban housing.409  But, all informal 
normative orders are not born equal.  While some values and 
desires are inherent to a community, others are fashioned as 
tactical responses to threatening forces.  Many customary norms 
in the global South emerged after initial separation of native 
peoples from the commons and colonial inventions of tradition.410  
Many norms of the informal sector emerged in response to 
predatory capitalist markets.  While signifying ingenuity and re-
sistance of impacted groups, these norms presuppose hostile and 
overarching legal regimes that dispossess and marginalize them.  
We must remain mindful that colonial and postcolonial 
coexistence of modes of production is not a horizontal articulation 
of different modes.  Imperatives of capitalism demarcate the 
conditions of possibility of non-capitalist modes.  As a result, the 
informal sector remains “locked in an asymmetrical relation” of 
“subordination” to the accumulation economy.411  Recognition of 
porous legality and plurality of legal frames does not necessarily 
 
 405 Ananya Roy, Urban Informality: Towards an Epistemology of Planning, 71 J. AM. 
PLAN. ASS’N 147, 149 (2005).  See also Ray Bromley, Power, Property, and Poverty: Why De 
Soto’s “Mystery of Capital” Cannot Be Solved, in URBAN INFORMALITY, supra note 176, at 
271, 277–83. 
 406 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 402, at 181. 
 407 Moore, supra note 92, at 98–99. 
 408 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 402, at 179. 
 409 For a thoughtful analysis of the theoretical questions involved and examples of 
informal property norms, see Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, Extralegal Property, Legal 
Monism, and Pluralism, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 213, 214 (2009). 
 410 See generally Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa, in 
THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 260–62 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1992) 
(discussing how traditions in Africa developed). 
 411 SANYAL, supra note 77, at 220. 
Do Not Delete 12/12/2010 7:34 PM 
62 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 14:1 
imply that resistive norms of the marginalized furnish adequate 
grounds for alleviation of their predicaments. 
Evidence from the global South suggests that regularization 
of slum ownership without radical changes in larger public 
policies has marginal positive impact at best, and has more often 
aggravated the condition of slum-dwellers.412  In tune with de 
Soto, the neoliberal apothecary, the World Bank’s 2003 report 
prescribes private property as the answer to the land question.413  
However, even a World Bank working paper acknowledged that 
“it would be dangerous to promote formal titling as the sole 
solution necessary to solve the problems of the urban poor . . . .  
[W]here the capital markets are underdeveloped and a spectrum 
of ownership structures exist, titling alone will not ‘unlock’ 
capital.”414  De Soto claimed that in “developing countries much 
of the teeming mass does not consist of oppressed legal 
proletarians but of oppressed extralegal small entrepreneurs.”415  
Labeling those marooned in the informal sector “entrepreneurs,” 
however, does not change their condition of life.  Most slum-
dwellers are renters of land “owned” by powerful criminal and 
political interests.  For such owners, regularization is a bonanza, 
but for tenants this often amounts to ejection from any form of 
housing.  Tax collectors, municipal utility charges, fracturing of 
intra-slum solidarities and slums within slums quickly became 
visible as a result of commodification and real estate submarket 
consolidation that issues from deregulation.416 
A recent study that interrogates de Soto’s panacea of 
legalization of extra-legally occupied dwellings in the light of the 
experience of Bogota, finds claims about the dynamics of housing 
market informality and the benefits of formal title wanting.417  
The experience of other countries and cities confirms this 
 
 412 See Geoffrey Payne, unpublished report, quoted in ALAN GILBERT & ANN VARLEY, 
LANLORD AND TENANT: HOUSING THE POOR IN URBAN MEXICO 4 (1991); Suzana Taschner, 
Squatter Settlements and Slums in Brazil, in HOUSING THE URBAN POOR 215, 216–19 
(Brian Aldrich & Ravinder Sandhu eds., 1995). 
 413 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 402, at 67; KLAUS DEININGER, 
LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION xvii–xxi (2003). 
 414 Robert M. Buckley & Jerry. Kalarickal, Shelter Strategies for the Urban Poor: 
Idiosyncratic and Successful, but Hardly Mysterious 22–23 (World Bank Policy Research, 
Working Paper No. 3427, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/ 
39291.pdf?abstractid=625305&mirid=1. 
 415 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 402, at 216. 
 416 Donald A. Krueckeberg, The Lessons of John Locke or Hernando de Soto: What If 
Your Dreams Come True?, 15 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 1, 3–4 (2004). 
 417 Carmen G. Gonzalez, Squatters, Pirates, and Entrepreneurs: Is Informality the 
Solution to the Urban Housing Crisis?, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 239, 239–51, 
(2009). 
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conclusion.418  A landmark study of slums points out that the de 
Sotoian “semi-utopian view of the informal sector, however, 
grows out of a nested set of epistemological fallacies.”419 
In tune with the recommendations of the legalist school, an 
adverse possession model has been attempted sporadically in 
some counties.420  In the 1990s, Peru instituted this mode 
through the Formalization Commission of Informal Property 
(COFOPRI).421  The model suffers from various problems.  
Squatters must continue to bear the costs of acquiring and 
occupying land that they do not own for a long time, giving rise to 
violence and protection rackets.422  This model also does not 
address the fact that squatter settlements are often located on 
marginal and ecologically vulnerable lands.423  Neither does it 
address provision of services and public health issues, or deter 
future squatting and continued cycles of remedial responses. It 
has marginal impact on wealth disparity between occupants of 
extra-legal settlements and legal property owners because titling, 
on average, increases value of untitled property by a mere 
 
 418 See Brian R. Roberts, From Marginality to Social Exclusion: From Laissez Faire to 
Pervasive Engagement, 39 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 195, 195–97 (2004); PETER WARD, MEXICO 
CITY 193 (1998); Taschner, supra note 412, at 217–19; Jean-Louis Van Gelder, Tales of 
Deviance and Control: On Space, Rules, and Law in Squatter Settlements, 44 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 239, 262 (2010). 
 419 DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 179.  These include the failure to 
distinguish between micro-accumulation and sub-subsistence, and between informal petty 
bourgeoisie and informal proletariat. Id. at 180.  “[M]ost participants of the informal 
economy directly or indirectly work for someone else.” Id.  There is growing inequality 
within the networks of exploitation of the informal sector. Id. at 181.  Informality 
increases the exploitation and abuse of women and children. Id.  Rather than generating 
new jobs, the informal sector fragments existing work and subdivides incomes. Id.  
Gambling, lotteries, pyramid schemes, and even quasi-magical and spiritual promises of 
wealth proliferate in the informal sector. Id. at 183.  Reform of the informal sector has 
little impact on structural inequities of the economy and resulting poverty. Id.  Increased 
competition within the informal sector rapidly depletes the collective social capital of the 
marginalized and dissolves self-help networks and political solidarities among the urban 
poor. Id. 
 420 Common law typically provides a statute of limitations “fixing the period of time 
beyond which the owner of land can no longer bring an action, or undertake self-help, for 
the recovery of his land from a person in possession of the land.” Winter King, Illegal 
Settlements and the Impact of Titling Programs, 44 HARVARD INT’L L. J. 433, 448 (2003) 
(quoting RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.01 (Michael Allen Woe ed., 
2003)).  For such a claim to be ripe, “the possession [must] be (1) actual, (2) open and 
notorious, (3) exclusive, (4) continuous, and (5) hostile under a claim of right.” Id.  Most 
civil law jurisdictions have similar provisions; for example, usucapiao in Brazil and 
prescripcion adquisitiva in Peru.  As opposed to common law, usucapiao or prescripcion 
adquistiva can be used against vacant public land. Id. at 449.  See also EDESIO 
FERNANDES, LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN BRAZIL 118 (1995). 
 421 King, supra note 420, at 449. 
 422 Id. at 450. 
 423 Id.  See also JORGE E. HARDOY & DAVID SATTERTHWAITE, SHELTER: NEED AND 
RESPONSE 232–33 (1981). 
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23.5%.424  Fearful that new owners will promptly sell their titles 
for profit, states often prohibit transfer of title and subdivisions 
for substantial periods of time or indefinitely.425  Finally, re-
quirement of public and notorious possession encourages 
settlements in ecologically vulnerable areas.426 
Another legalization model grants titles on a case-by-case 
basis.  This was done, for example, in Peru as a once-for-all 
regularization under a 1961 law, and in India and Mexico at 
various stages.427  Ruling parties generally deploy this model 
close to elections to gain political support and votes.428  The ad-
hoc nature of the model and its dependence upon whims of 
political authorities makes this an unstable and unpredictable 
mode of regularization.  Furthermore, it does not address issues 
of squatting costs, lack of services, environmental concerns, and 
intra-slum divides.  The dominant result has been that 
“[s]peculative rises in the price of land and the costs imposed on 
residents both directly and indirectly (in the form of service 
charges and property taxes) lead to the displacement of the 
original population.  Rather than increasing security of tenure, 
regular-ization actually diminishes it.”429  Indeed, regularization 
is often misused by landowners to their profit by using squatters 
for their ends.  The case of Lima is illustrative: 
Very often landowners and private developers have manipulated the 
squatters into forcing portions of the land onto the real estate market, 
by obtaining from the authorities some urban infrastructure for the 
squatters, thus enhancing the land value and opening the way for 
profitable housing construction.  In a second phase, the squatters are 
expelled from the land they have occupied and forced to start all over 
 
 424 Jean O. Lanjouw & Philip I. Levy, Untitled: A Study of Formal and Informal 
Property Rights in Urban Ecuador, 112 ECON. J. 986, 988 (2002).  This data is based on a 
study of Guayaquil, Ecuador. 
 425 King, supra note 420, at 446. 
 426 See Lee J. Johnson et al., A Model of Rural Conflict: Violence and Land Reform 
Policy in Brazil, 4 ENV’T. & DEV. ECON. 135, 157–58 (1999); Arild Angelsen, Playing 
Games in the Forest: State-Local Conflicts of Land Appropriation, 77 LAND ECON. 285, 291 
(2001). 
 427 See Alain Durand-Lasserve, Law and Urban Change in Developing Countries: 
Trends and Issues, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 401, at 157, 234; Kenneth A. Manaster, 
The Problem of Urban Squatters in Developing Countries: Peru, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 23, 42–
43 (1968).  In the case of Mexico this also involved extra-legal subdivisions and 
development of ejodi lands—a form of collectively owned communal property developed 
after the Mexican revolution.  The community could not alienate its ejido property, nor 
lose it through prescription.  The land was set aside for agriculture with strict restrictions 
on development. Antonio Azuela de la Cueva, Low Income Settlements and the Law in 
Mexico City, 11 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 522, 530–31 (1987). 
 428 Antonio Azuela & Emilio Duhau, Tenure Regularization, Private Property and 
Public Order in Mexico, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 401, at 157, 168; Azuela de la 
Cueva, supra note 427, at 526; Ann Varley, The Political Uses of Illegality: Evidence from 
Urban Mexico, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 401, at 172–75. 
 429 Azuela & Duhau, supra note 428, at 163. 
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again on the frontier of a city which has expanded as a result of their 
efforts.430 
A more productive model is the “state as developer” model,431 
with direct state planning, intervention, and investment in “sites 
and services” projects.432  While this model was only marginally 
successful in Mexico and Peru,433 there is the relatively 
successful and “[o]verlooked [e]xperience in Iran.”434  The 
revolutionary government of Iran inherited exploding urban 
growth, concentration of land ownership, and a choke-hold of 
landed interests over land and housing policies.435  A series of 
laws introduced between 1979 and 1992 aimed to regulate the 
urban land market and urban housing with the objective of 
“acquisition of excess urban land above a defined limit and its 
direct allocation for housing [through public channels], co-
operatives and the private sector.”436  Islamic law was deployed 
whereby the state could rightly acquire undeveloped land for 
distribution without compensation.437  The impact on direct land 
 
 430 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE GRASSROOTS: A CROSS-CULTURAL THEORY 
OF URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 191 (1983). 
 431 King, supra note 420, at 458.  This study used seven criteria for comparison 
between the various models utilized to deal with the problem of extra-legal settlements, 
and it found that “state as developer” model comparatively most effective.  The criteria 
are: prevention of violence, prevention of the use of unsuitable land, public services, entry 
into the formal sector, rule of law, discourage further extra-legal settlements, increase of 
wealth, and viable alternative to extra-legal settlements. Id. at 447.  This study also finds 
the model, as practiced in Iran, to be the most attractive alternative. Id. at 460–61, 466. 
 432 Peter M. Ward, Land for Housing the Poor: How Can Planners Contribute?, in 
LAND FOR HOUSING THE POOR 34, 39 (Shlomo Angel et al. eds., 1983).  Ward defines “sites 
and services” as state “sponsorship of land subdivisions in which a basic service network 
was installed from the outset.” Id. 
 433 See generally King, supra note 420, at 468; Ann Varley, The Relationship Between 
Tenure Legalization and Housing Improvements: Evidence from Mexico City, 18 DEV. & 
CHANGE 463 (1987). 
 434 Ramin Keivani et al., Public Management of Urban Land, Enabling Markets and 
Low-income Housing Provision: The Overlooked Experience of Iran, 45 URB. STUD. 1825, 
1848 (2008).  A comprehensive comparative study also finds the “state as developer” 
model, as practiced in Iran, the most attractive alternative. King, supra note 420, at 458–
61.  See also Mohammad Mehdi Azizi, The Provision of Urban Infrastructure in Iran: An 
Empirical Evaluation, 32 URB. STUD. 507, 520–21 (1995); Mohammad Mehdi Azizi, The 
User-Pays System in the Provision of Urban Infrastructure: Effectiveness and Equity 
Criteria, 37 URB. STUD. 1345, 1348–49 (2000); Mohammad Mehdi Azizi, Evaluation of 
Urban Land Supply Policy in Iran, 22 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 94, 103 (2002); 
Mohammad Mehdi Azizi, Provision of Urban Public Facilities through the Development of 
Public Commercial Land in Iran, 19 HABITAT INT’L 269, 276–77 (1995) [hereinafter Azizi, 
Provision of Urban Public Facilities]. 
 435 Keivani et al., supra note 434, at 1832.  In 1978, about eighty-five percent of land 
within Tehran belonged to the royal family and a few others. Id.  Ninety percent of the 
eighty million square meters of land on the outskirts of Tehran belonged to ten percent of 
the landowners. Id.  The land in Tehran increased by five hundred percent between 1971 
and 1976. Id. 
 436 Id. 
 437 See, e.g., Mehrdad Valibeigi, Banking and Credit Rationing Under the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 25 IRANIAN STUD. 51, 64 (1992). 
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provision and the land market was dramatic.438  Within a ten 
year period 85,557 hectors of urban land was acquired by the 
Urban Land Organization (ULO).439  Seventy-seven percent of 
the land was allocated for housing, and the rest for commercial, 
industrial and public service purposes.440  The land reserved for 
commercial projects was sold and thirty percent of the profit was 
given to municipalities to provide services, giving priority to 
green spaces, schools, clinics, and health centers.441  Until 1985, 
the focus was on the public sector provision of infrastructure to 
new residential areas.442  The program was expensive and was 
plagued with inefficiency.  In 1985, a revised plan aimed at 
addressing the problem ex ante.443  The state acquired land close 
to cities, laid out infrastructure—roads, electricity, and sewer 
systems—and allotted housing plots to applicants on a user-pay 
financing basis.  The fees for the development were paid by 
future occupants either before or after occupation.444  By selecting 
land for acquisition, urban migration was steered to mid-sized 
cities in addition to areas around large metropoles.445  Cost re-
coupment ratio was satisfactory, and where payments exceeded 
development costs, the surplus was plowed back into additional 
services like hospitals and schools. 
In a ten year period land was transferred to 422,864 families 
through direct allocation (234,000), housing cooperative societies 
(131,000) and public and private developers (58,000).446  Between 
1976 and 1986, the housing stock doubled, increasing from 
2,377,586 to 4,685,666.447  Even the World Bank was constrained 
to acknowledge that provision of public land had “play[ed] an 
important role in attracting developers to invest in low-income 
housing and in rental accommodations,” and that this approach 
“should be explored as part of a housing policy concerned 
particularly with provision of low-income housing.”448  Analysts 
conclude that: 
Iran substantially expanded the stock of low-income urban 
housing . . . by directly providing land . . . effectively by-passing urban 
land and housing markets and their shortcomings [through policies] 
 
 438 See Keivani et al., supra note 434, at 1833–40 (detailing the statistical data that 
evidences this impact). 
 439 Id. at 1833. 
 440 Id. at 1836. 
 441 Azizi, Provision of Urban Public Facilities, supra note 434, at 273, 277. 
 442 King, supra note 420, at 459. 
 443 Id. 
 444 Id. 
 445 Id. 
 446 Keivani et al., supra note 434, at 1825, 1836. 
 447 Azizi, Provision of Urban Public Facilities, supra note 434, at 271. 
 448 Keivani et al., supra note 434, at 1841. 
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designed specifically to benefit a large section of low and middle-
income sectors that would otherwise be excluded land and housing 
markets.449 
As practiced in Iran, the state as developer and sites and 
services models address the extra-legal settlement problem ex 
ante, and avoid social and human costs of squatting.450  Planned 
selection of settlement sites helps preclude environmentally 
fragile and hazardous landscapes.451  Provision of services before 
occupation avoids public health issues.452  Land bearing legal 
title enters the market through the state, thus avoiding 
transaction costs of regularization.453  Concerns remain that 
user-pay financing may keep such housing out of the reach of the 
destitute.454  However, if the state were to subsidize the cost of 
occupation for the poor, this model can become an effective 
means of redistributing wealth and directing public resources to 
alleviate a critical social problem, i.e., housing for the urban poor.  
Sustained governmental foresight and a political commitment 
toward the urban poor are the key ingredients of this model. 
The experience of Iran substantiates that housing for the 
urban poor is primarily a political problem, one that requires 
political will that issues from composition of the power-bloc.  
Note that the primary social base of political support for the 
revolutionary regime in Iran was provided by the urban poor and 
the lower middle classes.455  Due to the early legitimacy of the 
revolution, any backlash from other interest groups toward the 
policy to house the urban poor was not powerful enough to derail 
the program.456  As merchant groups gained ascendency within 
the power-bloc in the 1990s Iran yielded to the pressures and 
temptations of neoliberal restructuring, and land and housing 
policy were increasingly influenced by supply-side policies.457  
 
 449 Id. at 1848.  Similar public interventions in the housing market have produced 
desirable results in Sweden. See S. S. Duncan, House Building, Profits and Social 
Efficiency in Sweden and Britain, 1 HOUS. STUDIES 11, 13 (1986); James Barlow, 
Controlling the Housing Land Market: Some Examples from Europe, 307 URB. STUD. 
1129, 1133 (1992).  See also MICHAEKL BALL, HOUSING POLICY AND ECONOMIC POWER: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OWNER OCCUPATION 4 (1983). 
 450 Keivani et al., supra note 434, at 1848–49. 
 451 Id. at 1827. 
 452 King, supra note 420, at 450–51. 
 453 Sheila R. Foster, Urban Informality as a Commons Dilemma, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 261, 278 (2008). 
 454 Keivani et al., supra note 434, at 1844. 
 455 See Charles Kurzman, The Qum Protests and the Coming of the Iranian 
Revolution, 27:3 SOC. SCI. HIST. 287, 299–300 (2003); NIKKI R. KEDDIE, MODERN IRAN: 
ROOTS AND RESULTS OF REVOLUTION 232 (2006). 
 456 Keivani et al., supra note 434, at 1849. 
 457 Id. at 1832.  Policies shifted toward commercial allocation and full cost recovery, 
reduction of individual land allocation, and increased reliance on mass housing provision 
by private developers. Id. 
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The negative impact was quick.  The housing situation in urban 
areas worsened progressively, going through several cycles of 
boom and bust.458  Housing prices escalated and, feeling political 
pressure, the government was recently forced to announce new 
measures of land allocation and subsidized housing in new 
housing projects.459  Even with its substantial success, the 
challenge remains whether the “state as developer” model can be 
replicated in the global South beyond Iran.  All social formations 
of the global South are not commensurable; certainly not in 
regard to their power-blocs.  What is needed is an overarching 
conceptual principle that can guide suitable remedial strategies 
in diverse settings. 
B. Toward the Right to the City 
Injecting extreme competition in the already impoverished 
and exploitative informal sector as prescribed by neoliberalism is 
to “simply grease the skids to a Hobbesian hell.”460  A promising 
path out of this Hobbesian hell may be the incipient right to the 
city.  The concept, first introduced by Henry Lefebvre in the late 
1960s,461 and characterized as “one of the most precious yet most 
neglected of our human rights,”462 is playing an influential role in 
urban politics in Latin America and international efforts to 
develop a “World Charter on the Right to the City.”463 
Lefebvre saw the right to the city not as a natural or 
contractual right, but as one that issues from the entitlement to 
urban space “of the whole society and firstly of all those who 
inhabit.”464  Lefebvre’s point of departure is that while the scope 
of human rights has expanded as a result of social movements 
and political struggles, the rights of the citizen largely remain 
the same as stipulated in the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizens of 1789.465  Therefore, an expansion of the rights of 
 
 458 Id. at 1849. 
 459 Id. 
 460 DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 185. 
 461 See HENRI LEFEBVRE, WRITINGS ON CITIES 6 (Eleonore Kofman & Elibeth Lebas 
eds., 1996). 
 462 Harvey, The Right to the City, supra note 60, at 23. 
 463 Edesio Fernandes, Constructing the ‘Right to the City’ in Brazil, 16:2 SOC. & 
LEGAL STUD. 201, 201–02 (2007).  For detailed explication of Lefebvre’s construct of the 
right to the city, see Mark Purcell, Excavating Lefebvre: The Right to the City and its 
Urban Politics of the Inhabitant, 58 GEOJOURNAL 99, 100 (2002); DON MITCHELL, THE 
RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC SPACE 19 (2003); David 
Harvey, The Right to the City: From Capital Surplus to Accumulation by Dispossession, in 
ACCUMULATION BY DISPOSSESSION, supra note 180, at 17. 
 464 HENRI LEFEBVRE, WRITING ON CITIES, supra note 461, at 158. 
 465 The scope of international human rights has moved beyond civil and political 
rights to include economic and social rights and collective solidarity rights. See Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 
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the citizen is needed to address new relations between 
individuals and society in modern urban life.  He linked 
reconfiguration of citizenship rights with democratic governance 
of cities, the primary zone of modern collective life.466  Rather 
than rejecting classic liberal political rights, Lefebvre aimed to 
build upon them to include the right to information, the right to 
culture, the right to identity in difference and in equality, the 
right of democratic control of the economy and politics, the right 
to public services, and above all, the right to the city.467  The 
right to the city consists of the right of all city-dwellers to fully 
enjoy urban life with all its services and advantages—the right to 
habitation, as well as playing a direct role in the management of 
cities.  This calls for an emphasis on use value of all things urban 
in order to redress the social imbalances that issue from 
excessive emphasis on exchange value, the hallmark of the 
production of urban space under capitalism.  Besides a claim 
upon adequate urban services and management, it includes full 
use of space by those who inhabit the city, including the right 
against segregation and expulsion from social life.  Most 
importantly, it seeks an active participatory role in “all circuits of 
decision-making leading to the control and development of the 
organization of social space,” in order to resist the control of 
space by the state and capital.468 
The right to the city can compliment constructs of political 
citizenship with a broader notion of “urban citizenship.”469  It 
signals legitimization of collective struggles to transform the 
“power relations that underlie the production of space, 
fundamentally shifting control away from capital and the state 
and toward urban inhabitants.”470  It not only expands the 
eligibilities of those traditionally considered members of the 
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political community, i.e., citizens, but could bring refugees, 
asylum seekers, and the undocumented within the zone of 
eligibilities and entitlements on account of their spatial 
presence.471  Of course, we have to be mindful that “the number 
of rightless peoples also grows even as human rights norms and 
standards proliferate.”472  We also have to note the critique of the 
classic discourse of rights for its formalism, questionable claims 
of universality, limited scope, and failures in implementation.473  
Furthermore, framing all issues and strategies in the language of 
rights may itself impede their realization.474  The right to the city 
is amenable to readings that may restrict it and simply add to 
the portfolio of individual liberties best suited for the interests of 
the powerful political and economic elites.  If it is to challenge 
hegemonic liberal political and neoliberal market constructs, this 
right has to be envisaged as more than an individual liberty to 
access urban resources, and seen instead as a collective right to 
reshape the process of urbanization.  The right would be 
meaningful only if it entails democratic control over deployment 
of surplus, and management of urban development.  It is 
imperative that counter-hegemonic social movements remain the 
drivers of this right which is essentially a solidarity right.  Only 
then will it become an effective instrument to address the 
inequities of urban life.  David Harvey has called for the adoption 
of the right to the city both as a slogan and a political project 
because 
it focuses on the question of who commands the necessary connection 
between urbanization and surplus production and use.  The 
democratization of that right, and the construction of a broad social 
movement to enforce its will is imperative if the dispossessed are to 
take back the control which they have for so long been denied, and if 
they are to institute new modes of urbanization.475 
A productive model is furnished by the struggle for the right 
to the city as it has unfolded in Brazil.476  It rests on the principle 
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that regulation of urban development is a public matter that 
cannot be reduced to either individual or state interests.  The 
right is then seen as an ensemble of rights of all residents of the 
city—the right to housing, the right to urban planning, the right 
to environmental preservation, the right to capture surplus 
value, and the right to regularize informal settlements.  A 
landmark in this context was the enactment of Federal Law No. 
10.257, entitled “City Statute,” in Brazil on July 10, 2001.477  The 
statute aims to regulate the framework of urban policy 
introduced by the 1988 Federal Constitution that explicitly 
recognized a collective right to the city, affirmed a central role for 
local governments, and declared that representative democracy 
be reconciled with participatory political process.478  The City 
Statute provides the frame of interpretation of the constitutional 
principle of the social function of urban property and the city, 
lays down a regulatory framework for the construction and 
financing of urban development by municipalities, prescribes the 
design of democratic management of cities, and identifies legal 
modalities for comprehensive regularization of informal settle-
ments in private and public urban areas.479 
Another promising development is the proposal for a “World 
Charter for Human Rights in Cities,” first proposed at the VI 
Brazilian Conference on Human Rights in 2001.480  It was 
inspired generally by the international instruments on civil, 
political, social, cultural, and environmental rights, and in 
particular by the European Charter for Safeguarding of Human 
Rights in the City,481 and by the Treaty for Democratic, Equitable 
and Sustainable Cities, Towns and Villages.482  The World Social 
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Forum, the umbrella “movement of movements,”483 has been the 
primary vehicle to elaborate the World Charter and to design 
strategies for its adoption by the United Nations.484  In 2005, UN-
HABITAT and UNESCO launched a joint initiative entitled 
“Urban Policies and the Right to the City” aimed at social 
mobilization for the World Charter.485  The objective of the World 
Charter is to recognize and to establish legal mechanisms to 
enforce the right to the city in its social, economic, cultural, and 
political dimensions.486  It seeks to redesign international norms 
of economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights in a more 
clearly defined framework of the right to the city.487  If approved 
by the United Nations, the World Charter would confer 
legitimacy to social movements of the urban poor and slum-
dwellers.  It would help develop international legal norms for 
human rights to guide public, community, and private agents to 
ensure equitable and sustainable distribution and use of urban 
land and resources.  In this role, it could serve as a useful 
instrument in the struggle of slum-dwellers and the urban 
poor.488  The right to the city can facilitate recovering the original 
meaning of the city—the body of citizens, and the community.  
We have to recognize, however, that general declarations of 
rights are important but not sufficient.  Effective social 
movements and locus standi for individuals and social 
movements to enforce those rights through the courts are 
essential for the realization of such a right.  Even the 
enforcement of this right at the level of the cities may remain 
largely symbolic if international and national economic and 
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urban policies remain imprisoned in the straitjacket of the global 
rule of capital, particularly its neoliberal reincarnation. 
CONCLUSION 
The persistence and growth of slums is perhaps the most 
eloquent testimony of the failures of the capitalist world order.  
Machinations of global capital, managerial designs of global 
management, national policies imprisoned in bankrupt 
development models, and the absence of comprehensive social 
movements remain hurdles in any road to dignity and full 
participation in political and socio-economic life for marginalized 
populations.  It is a particular burden of scholars to devise 
strategies to reverse this state of affairs.  Correct diagnosis 
remains indispensible to productive prescriptions.  The primary 
intellectual challenge is to cut through the ideological fog that 
envelops the operations and effects of socio-economic orders 
procreated by the rule of unbridled capital accumulation.  We 
have to contest and interrogate propositions that phenomena like 
slums, urban poverty, and human misery are accidental, 
incidental, or a mandate of the natural scheme of things.  The 
connection between accelerating urban poverty in the global 
South and global accumulation of capital has to be clearly 
understood, along with the supporting roles of global managers, 
national policy makers, and local administrators.  Legal scholars 
face a particular challenge to interrogate the role of law in this 
context.  Our theories of citizenship, class, identity formation, 
and social change must take into account the rhythms of lived 
experiences of the urban poor.  Only then can transformative 
prescriptive designs be imagined and implemented.  To address 
this historic agenda, we will do well to learn from and build upon 
the daily struggles and resistive ingenuities of slum-dwellers.  In 
an evocative scene of Slumdog Millionaire, while torturing the 
slum-dweller protagonist, a police officer inquires: “What can a 
slumdog possibly know?” The protagonist responds: “The 
answers!”489 
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